Nuclear Implementing Plans (Bruce)

NUCLEAR IMPLEMENTING PLANS (BRUCE)

Provincial Nuclear Emergency
Response Plan (PNERP)

Implementing Plan for the
Bruce Nuclear Generating Station
(BNGS)

March 2018

Prepared by Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management

Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services

ORDER IN COUNCIL

Executive Council of Ontario - Order in Council
Executive Council of Ontario - Order in Council

Table of Contents

The province of Ontario’s Nuclear Emergency Response Plan has been developed pursuant to Section 8 of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 9 (hereafter referred to as the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act or EMCPA). The current edition of this plan supersedes and replaces all older versions which should be destroyed.

Holders of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan Implementing Plan for the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station are responsible for keeping it updated by incorporating amendments, which may be issued from time to time.

This plan is administered by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services of Ontario. All comments and suggestions relating to it should be directed to:

Figure I: Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Planning Structure
Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Planning Structure Diagram

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING STRUCTURE

The structure for nuclear and radiological emergency response planning in Ontario, illustrated on the previous page, consists of the following components:

  1. The Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP); developed pursuant to Section 8 of the EMCPA and subject to Cabinet approval:
    • The Master Plan: sets out the overall principles, policies, basic concepts, organizational structures and responsibilities.
    • The Implementing Plans: the elements of the Master Plan are applied to each major nuclear site, transborder emergencies and other types of radiological emergencies, and detailed provincial implementing plans developed. The major organization plans (as per Figure I) should be consistent with the requirements of these implementing plans.
  2. Major organization plans: Each major organization involved (e.g., provincial ministries, agencies, boards and commissions, municipalities, and nuclear organizations, etc.) develops its own plan to carry out the relevant roles, responsibilities and tasks agreed to by them and consistent with their mandate. These plans are based on, and should be consistent with the PNERP and its Implementing Plans.
  3. Procedures: Based on all of the above plans, procedures are developed for the various emergency centres to be set up and for the various operational functions required.
  4. Checklists: The culmination of the planning process is the development of checklists based on the requirements of the procedures, e.g., individual position or function-specific checklists.

All emergency organizations involved in the preparation and implementation of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan should employ common terminology. The terminology contained in the Glossary, Annex D, should be used for this purpose by all concerned.  Words or phrases defined in the Glossary are italicized within the text of this document. Further reference information can be found in the Incident Management System (IMS) doctrine at www.ontario.ca/ims.

AAZ
Automatic Action Zone
ALARA
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ARGOS
Accident Reporting and Guidance Operational System
BDBA
Beyond Design Basis Accident
BNGS
Bruce Nuclear Generating Station
Bq
Becquerel
BWR
Boiling Water Reactor
CANDU
Canada Deuterium Uranium (reactor)
CCEM
Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management
CEOC
Community Emergency Operations Centre
CEOF
Corporate Emergency Operations Facility
CFIA
Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CMOH
Chief Medical Officer of Health
CNSC
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CPZ
Contingency Planning Zone
CRL
Chalk River Laboratories
CSA
Canadian Standards Association
DBA
Design Basis Accidents
DNGS
Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
DPZ
Detailed Planning Zone
ECCC
Environment and Climate Change Canada
ECI
Emergency Coolant Injection
EMC
Emergency Management Center
EMCPA
Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act
EME
Emergency Mitigating Equipment
ENERGY
Ministry of Energy
EIC
Emergency Information Centre
EOC
Emergency Operations Centre
EPZ
Emergency Planning Zone
EMST
Environmental Monitoring and Surveillance Team
ERAMG
Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group
FADS
Filtered Air Discharge System
FNEP
Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan
FNEP TAG
FNEP Technical Assessment Group
GC
Generic Criteria
GOC
Government Operations Centre
Gy
Gray
HC
Health Canada
HIRA
Hazard Identification Risk Assessment
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IMS
Incident Management System
INES
International Nuclear Event Scale
IPZ
Ingestion Planning Zone
ITB
Iodine Thyroid Blocking
KI
Potassium Iodide
km
Kilometre
LGIC
Lieutenant Governor in Council
LOCA
Loss-of-Coolant Accident
MCSCS
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services
MCSS
Ministry of Community and Social Services
MDU
Monitoring and Decontamination Unit
MEOC
Ministry Emergency Operations Centre
Met
Meteorology, meteorological
MLDP
Modèle Lagrangien de Dispersion de Particules
MMA
Ministry of Municipal Affairs
MNR
Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry
MOECC
Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change
MOHLTC
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
MOL
Ministry of Labour
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MTO
Ministry of Transportation
MW
Megawatts
NAADS
National Alert Aggregation and Dissemination System
NEMCC
Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee
NGS
Nuclear Generating Station
NIG
Nuclear Incident Group
NRCan
Natural Resources Canada
OIL
Operational Intervention Level
OMAFRA
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
OPP
Ontario Provincial Police
PCEIO
Provincial Chief Emergency Information Officer
PEOC
Provincial Emergency Operations Centre
PLERP
Provincial Liquid Emission Response Plan
PNERP
Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan
PNGS
Pickering Nuclear Generating Station
PPE
Personal Protective Equipment
RD
Radiological Device
RDD
Radiological Dispersal Device
RED
Radiological Exposure Device
RHRP
Radiation Health Response Plan
RIMPUFF
Risø Mesoscale PUFF
SAMG
Severe Accident Management Guidelines
URI
Unified RASCAL Interface
USA
United States of America
UTCC
Unified Transportation Coordination Centre
UTMP
Unified Transportation Management Plan

Chapter 1 SCOPE AND AUTHORITY

    1. Aim

      The aim of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) Implementing Plan for the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station (BNGS) is to describe the measures that should be undertaken to mitigate the off-site effects of a nuclear emergency at BNGS.

    2. Scope

      1. This implementing plan shall be read and applied in the context of the PNERP Master Plan.
      2. In case of any apparent differences between the provisions of the PNERP Master Plan and this Implementing Plan, the latter being more detailed and specific is applicable.
      3. Together, these two plans focus on provincial level actions and should therefore be supplemented by the appropriate municipal plans and other supporting plans and procedures (see Sections 1.3 and 1.4 below).
      4. OFMEM shall establish and communicate guidance to verify stakeholder conformance with the PNERP Master Plan and this Implementing Plan.
    3. Designated and Support Municipalities

      1. Designated Municipalities
        1. The Municipality of Kincardine is the Designated Municipality in the Detailed Planning Zone with respect to BNGS (PNERP Master Plan, Annex A).
        2. The Town of Saugeen Shores is a Designated Host Municipality with respect to BNGS (PNERP Master Plan, Annex A).
        3. In this document the terms “municipal” and “Municipality” shall include, unless the context indicates otherwise, the Designated Municipality, as well as the local police services and local boards whose area of operation includes the area covered by the municipal plans.
        4. Pursuant to Section 3(4) of the EMCPA, as Designated Municipalities, the Municipality of Kincardine and Town of Saugeen Shores shall formulate plans to mitigate the off-site consequences of nuclear emergencies at BNGS.
        5. These plans shall also contain, where applicable, arrangements for the provision of services and assistance by municipal departments, local police services, fire services, paramedic services, hospitals and local boards.
        6. The plans prepared by the Designated Municipalities and by these other organizations, are collectively referred to as “municipal plans” in this document.
        7. As required by Section 8 of the EMCPA, municipal nuclear emergency response plans shall conform to the PNERP and be subject to the approval of the Solicitor General (this function is fulfilled by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services).  The Solicitor General may make such alterations as considered necessary for the purpose of coordinating the municipal plan with the province’s plan.
      2. Support Municipalities
        1. In the event of a declared emergency, the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) or the Premier may order a Municipality to provide support or assistance to Designated Municipalities or to affected municipalities.  Such orders, if made, would be authorized by Sections 7.0.2(4) or 7.0.3 of the EMCPA.
        2. Support and assistance may include, but shall not be limited to, personnel, equipment, services and material.
    4. Supporting Plans and Procedures

      1. Other jurisdictions and organizations that have, or are assigned, some responsibility for responding to a BNGS emergency should develop appropriate plans or procedures for carrying out their roles and tasks. They include:
        1. Provincial ministries, including:
          1. MOHLTC and the Radiation Health Response Plan
          2. MTO and the Unified Transportation Management Plan
          3. MCSCS and the Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group (ERAMG) Plan
          4. MCSCS and the Provincial Liquid Emission Response Plan (PLERP)
        2. Municipal departments, local police services, local boards and other agencies assigned roles and responsibilities in the municipal plans.
        3. The BNGS operator’s nuclear emergency plan and emergency procedures.
      2. Radiation Health Response Plan (RHRP)
        1. The MOHLTC issues the RHRP as an organizational plan under the PNERP.
        2. The RHRP establishes the roles and responsibilities, operational concepts and response principles for coordinating the provincial response of health organizations during a nuclear emergency.
      3. Unified Transportation Management Plan (UTMP)
        1. The BNGS UTMP, an organizational plan under the PNERP, shall be issued by the Ministry of Transportation (MTO), for the management of evacuating traffic in the Detailed Planning Zone as well as the traffic impact beyond it.
        2. Representatives of the OPP and local police services, municipal road authorities and emergency services shall cooperate with MTO in the development and maintenance of the UTMP and in its implementation during a nuclear emergency response through the Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC).
        3. The UTMP shall be designed to meet the requirements of the provincial and municipal nuclear emergency plans. For specific guidance see the following:
          1. Section 3.1.3 Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC)
          2. Section 3.4 Telecommunications
          3. Section 4.3  Internal Notifications
          4. Section 4.6 Early Phase Response
          5. Section 5.3.1 Evacuation
          6. Section 6.6 Entry Control
          7. Section 6.7 Transportation Management
      4. Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group (ERAMG) Plan

        The Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group (ERAMG) Plan issued by MCSCS (OFMEM) shall describe the means by which the environment, water, milk and foodstuffs are sampled and analyzed during a nuclear or radiological emergency, to determine their safety.

      5. Provincial Liquid Emission Response Plan (PLERP)

        The PLERP for BNGS is an organizational plan issued by the MCSCS (OFMEM) to mitigate the effects of a waterborne release from a reactor facility resulting in discharges with above normal levels of radioactivity. Additional guidance on the application of the PLERP coincident with a nuclear emergency is provided in Section 6.10.

    1. General

      1. This implementing plan details the response to an emergency at the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station (BNGS).
      2. BNGS is located at latitude 44° 20' North and longitude 81° 35' West, on the shores of Lake Huron.
      3. BNGS consists of two generating stations (Bruce ‘A’ and Bruce ‘B’). Bruce ‘A’ houses 4 CANDU nuclear reactors, each having a power generating capacity of 750 megawatts. The CANDU reactors at Bruce ‘B’ have 4 reactors of 822 megawatts.
      4. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic diagram of a CANDU reactor.
    2. The Hazard

      1. If an accident were to occur at BNGS, the most probable result would be that its effects would be confined within the station boundary because of the facility’s designed safety systems, structures and components.
      2. Nuclear emergency preparedness requires a planning basis which considers both design basis accidents, and significantly less probable beyond design basis accidents (BDBAs), including severe accidents and multi-unit scenarios where applicable.  For a detailed explanation regarding the basis for these reference accidents, refer to PNERP Master Plan, Annex L - PNERP Planning Basis Background.
      3. Design Basis Accidents (DBA)
        1. The DBA release provides the main platform for detailed planning and is generally characterized by one or more of the following:
          1. Station containment systems function normally allowing radiation to start decaying prior to a controlled release.
          2. Sufficient time would be available to alert the public and implement protective measures prior to a release.
          3. The main radiological hazard to people would be external exposure to, and inhalation of, radionuclides.
          4. Filter systems function to remove almost all of the radioactive particulate and radioiodine. As a result, the plume would be mostly comprised of inert noble gasses which would dissipate and do not pose a contamination hazard. 
          5. Radiation doses to the public would likely be below the generic criteria (GC) as defined in PNERP Master Plan, Annex E.
          6. Environmental contamination would be limited to very low levels.
          7. Low-level radioactive releases to the environment could occur on and off for some time (e.g., days or weeks).
        2. An example of a design basis accident scenario is a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), with the following typical progression:
          1. The reactor building would “box-up” preventing any immediate releases. A “box-up” is a condition whereby all possible release pathways to the environment, such as ventilation stacks, are closed.
          2. Duct connections from the reactor building to the vacuum building would open, thereby reducing the former’s internal pressure to below atmospheric pressure, drawing all radioactive material released from the damaged reactor fuel into the vacuum building. During this retention period the contained radioactivity would start to decay.
          3. If at any stage the pressure in the containment system nears atmospheric pressure, the contained radioactivity may be vented through filters to the environment. Such venting could be intermittent or continuous but may last for weeks (see Section 4.6.6). The level of radioactivity being released would progressively decline with time.
          4. Suitable meteorological conditions may make it possible to vent some of this contained radioactivity through filters in a direction away from populated areas. It may be possible to do this several times.
      4. Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA)
        1. One or more of the following may define a BDBA:
          1. Station containment systems may be impaired leading to significantly reduced hold up time and decay of radioactive materials.
          2. An early release of radioactivity from a BDBA with limited warning time.
          3. An uncontrolled release of radioactivity from a BDBA with limited warning time.
          4. The plume could include radioiodine and particulates along with noble gases.
          5. Radiation doses could potentially be high.
          6. Environmental contamination could be quantitatively significant in both extent and duration.
          7. The area affected could extend beyond the Detailed Planning Zone.
          8. A multi-unit accident (i.e., an accident involving more than one reactor).
        2. BDBAs which go unmitigated may evolve into severe accidents involving fuel degradation in the reactor core.
        3. The response to BDBAs, including severe accidents, is facilitated by the measures already in place to respond to DBAs (see 2.2.2 above) and the ability to expand their function.
        4. The following additional planning and preparedness actions shall be conducted to mitigate the much less probable, but possibly more severe, off-site effects of BDBAs:
          1. pre-distribution of Potassium Iodide (KI) pills (see Section 5.3.3)
          2. automatic, default actions to initiate public alerting (see Section 6.2) and to direct the implementation of protective actions, including sheltering-in-place (see Section 5.3.4) and evacuation (see Section 5.3.1)
          3. timely dispatch of aerial and ground monitoring teams to determine areas of contamination (see Section 4.7.3)
          4. priority evacuations for those closest to the hazard (see Section 5.3.1)
          5. extension of protection actions to the Contingency Planning Zone (CPZ), if required, to reduce potential for exposure
          6. radiation monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination of persons (see Section 6.9)
          7. medical assessment, treatment and counselling as required (see Section 6.9)
    3. Protective Actions

      1. The protective actions available for minimizing the radiation hazard in a nuclear emergency include:
        1. precautionary measures
        2. exposure control measures
        3. ingestion control measures
      2. These measures are listed in Table 2.1 below and defined in the glossary (Annex D).
      3. The operational use of these measures is described in appropriate sections of this plan.

      Table 2.1 Protective Actions for a Nuclear Emergency Response

      Table listing the various Precautionary Measures, Exposure Control Measures and Ingestion Control Measures.
      Precautionary Measures Exposure Control Measures Ingestion Control Measures
      • Closing of beaches, recreation areas, etc.
      • Closing of workplaces and schools
      • Suspension of non-critical patient admissions in hospitals
      • Sheltering-in-place
      • Iodine Thyroid Blocking
      • Evacuation
      • Milk control
      • Water control
      • Pasture control
      • Produce and crop control
      • Livestock control
    4. Planning Zones

      1. Automatic Action Zone (AAZ)
        1. The AAZ is a pre-designated area immediately surrounding a reactor facility where pre-planned protective actions would be implemented by default on the basis of reactor facility conditions with the aim of preventing or reducing the occurrence of severe deterministic effects.
        2. The BNGS AAZ is the area immediately surrounding the reactor facility extending out to an approximate radius of 3 kilometers. 
        3. The Automatic Action Zone comprises Detailed Planning Zone (DPZ) response sector 1 (see Figure 2.2) and includes an area adjacent to the BNGS Site boundary from Concession 8 to Inverhuron Provincial Park and extending east to Lake Range Road, Concession 6, the bluff and Concession 2.
      2. Detailed Planning Zone (DPZ)
        1. The DPZ is a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility, incorporating the Automatic Action Zone, where pre-planned protective actions are implemented as needed on the basis of reactor facility conditions, dose modelling, and environmental monitoring, with the aim of preventing or reducing the occurrence of stochastic effects.
        2. The BNGS DPZ is the area immediately surrounding the reactor facility extending out to an approximate radius of 10 kilometres.
        3. The Detailed Planning Zone for BNGS is shown in Figure 2.2. It includes the area within the Municipality of Kincardine bounded generally by County Road 11 and Concession 14 to the north, 10 Sideroad to the east, and Concession 7 to the south, but excluding the BNGS Site. The Detailed Planning Zone extends westward into Lake Huron to a radius of 10 kilometres.  The exact boundaries of the zone can be determined from Annex A.
      3. Contingency Planning Zone (CPZ)
        1. The CPZ is a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility, beyond the Detailed Planning Zone (see 2.4.1c) above), where contingency planning and arrangements are made in advance, so that during a nuclear emergency, protective actions can be extended beyond the Detailed Planning Zone as required to reduce potential for exposure.
        2. The BNGS CPZ is shown in Figure 2.3 and includes the area between 10 and 20 kilometres surrounding the reactor facility.
        3. Additional CPZ guidance is provided in Annex C.
      4. Ingestion Planning Zone (IPZ)
        1. The IPZ (see Figure 2.3) is a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility where plans or arrangements are made to:
          1. protect the food chain
          2. protect drinking water supplies
          3. restrict consumption and distribution of potentially contaminated produce, wild-grown products, milk from grazing animals, rainwater, animal feed

            Note: Wild-grown products can include mushrooms and game.

          4. restrict distribution of non-food commodities until further assessments are performed
        2. The BNGS IPZ encompasses all areas of the Counties of Bruce, Grey and Huron within a 50 km radius of the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station. The Ingestion Planning Zone includes the Automatic Action Zone, Detailed Planning Zone and Contingency Planning Zone. Figure 2.3 also shows the sub-zones of the Ingestion Planning Zone.
    5. Response Sectors

      1. The Detailed Planning Zone for BNGS is divided into 9 response sectors which fall into the following sector rings around the station:
        • Automatic Action Zone  Sector 1 and lake sector 7
        • Inner Ring           Sectors 2, 3 and lake sector 8
        • Outer Ring           Sectors 4, 5, 6 and lake sector 9
      2. The boundaries of the DPZ response sectors are shown in Figure 2.2, and are detailed in Annex A.
    6. Planning Data

      , Interface and Support
      1. Planning Times for Radioactive Emissions
        1. The time interval between the occurrence of an accident at BNGS and the commencement of an emission depends on the condition and functioning of the station containment system and on the effectiveness of the actions taken by station operators to reduce the rate of vacuum structure repressurization thus prolonging the holdup and decay of radioactive material within containment.
        2. For a normally functioning containment system, a minimum interval of 2 1/2 days (between the occurrence of the accident and the commencement of an emission) can be used for planning purposes.
        3. When venting does commence (see Section 4.6.6), intermittent releases of varying durations could continue for many weeks.
        4. In the exceptional situation where the containment system was impaired, an emission could commence much earlier; in some cases, very soon after the accident and, the emission may be continuous.
      2. Municipal Planning Data

        Designated Municipality nuclear emergency plans shall detail the planning data necessary to undertake an effective nuclear emergency response. This data should be organized according to planning zones, sub-zone and response sector, and include:

        1. population estimates (see Annex B)
        2. institutional data
        3. critical infrastructure
      3. Evacuation Time Estimates
        1. Evacuation time estimate studies shall be prepared and regularly updated to facilitate transportation planning and the management of transportation during a response.
        2. Evacuation time estimate studies shall be developed in accordance with NUREG/CR-7002, Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies, or similar standard.
        3. Evacuation time estimates shall be based on current census data and future population growth projections until end of life of the reactor facility and take into consideration shadow evacuations[1].
        4. The Province, Designated Municipalities and reactors facilities shall agree on their respective role in the development and maintenance of public evacuation time estimates and where they are documented. 
        5. Nuclear emergency response plans of provincial ministries, Designated Municipalities and reactor facilities shall identify:
          1. Their respective role in the development and maintenance of public evacuation time estimates.
          2. Where public evacuation time estimates are documented.
      4. Interface and Support
        1. The BNGS operator shall provide an interface and support for OFMEM in accordance with the PNERP Master Plan and regulatory requirements[2].
        2. For BNGS, this ensures that in the unlikely event of containment venting (see Section 4.6.6):
          1. There is a designated person onsite at all times with the authority for venting.
          2. The Province, Designated Municipalities and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) are consulted before undertaking any venting activity, unless venting must be performed in an urgent manner to protect the structural integrity of containment. In such a case, every effort shall be made to inform these stakeholders as early as possible.
    Figure 2.1: Nuclear Generating Unit Schematic of a CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor[3]
    Detailed Planning Zone and Response Sectors
    Figure 2.2: Detailed and Contingency Planning Zones
    Detailed Planning Zone and Response Sectors
    Figure 2.3: Ingestion Planning Zone
    Detailed Planning Zone and Response Sectors
    1. Emergency Response Organization

      1. The provincial Emergency Response Organization for managing a nuclear emergency at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station is shown in Figure 3.1 and detailed in the PNERP Master Plan, Chapter 4.
      2. Liaison Arrangements
        1. To ensure liaison and coordination between different elements of the Emergency Response Organization, the following arrangements and agreements shall be made:
          1. Each federal department and provincial ministry with a role in the emergency response to provide a representative to join the PEOC.
          2. The BNGS operator to provide:
            • a liaison officer to the Municipal EOC (see Paragraph 3.1.2 b) below for functions)
            • a corporate liaison representative to join the PEOC Operations Group
            • a technical support staff to support the PEOC Nuclear Incident Group (NIG) if requested and resources are available
          3. Provincial staff to be deployed to join the Municipal Emergency Operations Centres (MEOCs).
        2. The role of the BNGS operator liaison officer at the Municipal EOC is to act as a link to the station in respect of the following types of issues:
          1. BNGS operator support to the Municipalities, e.g., Monitoring and Decontamination Units and Emergency Worker Centres.
          2. Requests for mutual assistance (e.g., for additional personal monitoring resources, stable iodine tablets, fire or paramedic services at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station etc.).
          3. Coordination of the evacuation of non-essential station staff, and of the movement of essential staff to and from the site.
          4. Facilitating the work of the off-site field monitoring teams.
          5. Providing situational updates related to the emergency at the reactor facility.
          6. Providing technical briefings to the Municipal EOC staff in order to clarify the context within which the operational situation may be understood.
      3. Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC)

        A UTCC shall be set up and staffed for a BNGS emergency to implement the UTMP upon notification of either a partial or full activation response by the province.

      4. Provincial Ministry Offices

        The following regional, district and area offices of provincial ministries shall be prepared to respond to the emergency and provide the necessary assistance to the Designated Municipalities, as required by the PNERP Master Plan, Annex I and detailed in municipal plans or, as directed by their respective ministries:

        1. Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs - Clinton Office
        2. Community and Social Services - Southwest Region Office
        3. Community Safety and Correctional Services, OPP - Western Region
        4. Environment and Climate Change - Southwestern Region Office and Owen Sound Area Office
        5. Labour - Western Region, Hamilton and Radiation Protection Services, Toronto
        6. Municipal Affairs - Municipal Services Office, Western Region
        7. Natural Resources and Forestry- Aurora District
        8. Transportation - Central Region, West Region and the Emergency Management and Planning Office
      5. Designated Municipality Organization

        Emergency plans for the Designated Municipalities (Municipality of Kincardine and Town of Saugeen Shores) shall describe their municipal emergency response organizations and its activation.

    2. Contingency Provisions

      1. The PEOC Commander issues operational directives to the emergency management and response organization through the centres in the tier below (see Figure 3.1). However, if for any reason, any of these centres is not functioning or is not responsive, the PEOC Commander may issue operational directives directly to any other element of the emergency management and response organization.
      2. Similarly, response organizations are responsible for taking appropriate actions according to their respective plans, procedures and the requirements of the situation.
    3. Municipal Emergency Facilities

      1. Municipal nuclear emergency plans shall identify the location of the following emergency facilities in the DPZ and shall include provisions for their selection, staffing and resourcing:
        • Reception Centres
        • Evacuation Centres
        • Monitoring and decontamination for evacuees may be accomplished either in a Reception Centre or may be set up separately
        • Emergency Worker Centres (EWC). EWC locations should also be able to accommodate a command post for environmental monitoring operations of the Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group (ERAMG)
        • Emergency Information Centre
      2. Municipal nuclear emergency plans shall also identify the location of alternate Municipal emergency facilities outside the CPZ.
    4. Telecommunications

      1. All stakeholder emergency plans shall describe how their emergency centres and facilities are linked via primary and backup communication systems which enable email and transfer of emergency information.
      2. The BNGS operator shall establish primary and backup communications between its Emergency Management Center (EMC) and the following centres:
        1. Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC)
        2. Bruce Nuclear Generating Station (BNGS)
        3. Municipal Emergency Operations Centres (MEOCs)
      3. All organizations and agencies involved in responding to a BNGS nuclear emergency shall ensure the availability of backup telecommunications systems.
    Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Planning Structure Diagram
Figure 3.1: Provincial Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Organizational Structure
    1. Initial Notification

      1. According to responsibilities outlined in federal legislation, (see PNERP, Master Plan Paragraph 5.2.1) regulations and agreement with the provincial government, the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station (BNGS) operator shall notify the pre-designated contact points (see Paragraph 4.1.12 below) in provincial and municipal emergency organizations as soon as conditions arise at the facility which require such initial notification under the criteria described in Table 4.1 and, as incorporated in facility procedures.
      2. The form and content of the initial notification shall be determined by the Commissioner of Emergency Management.
      3. The BNGS operator shall make a notification to the designated provincial and municipal contact points within 15 minutes of categorizing the event.
      4. The initial notification message from the BNGS operator shall include:
        1. the notification category
        2. recommended default protective measures
      5. Where more than one criteria are applicable, the highest category triggered shall be reported in the notification. The notification message shall not be delayed to permit an accurate assessment of the applicable category.
      6. In the case of a General Emergency or On-Site Emergency notification, the message must state whether an emission is ongoing or if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence and the wind direction at the time of the notification.
      7. During the initial stage (see Paragraph 4.1.8 below) of an emergency, the General Emergency notification category (received by the PEOC Duty Officer) initiates the implementation of off-site default protective measures.
      8. The initial stage of an emergency is defined as the earlier of:
        1. The first 4 hours after the initial notification, or
        2. Once ongoing reporting by the BNGS EMC to the PEOC Scientific Section is established.
      9. At any time during an emergency, if the assessment of the on-site situation changes to warrant a different category than the one initially notified, then the BNGS operator shall immediately issue a change to the notification category and to any recommended default protective measures to the designated provincial and municipal contact points.
      10. In accordance with regulatory requirements[4], the BNGS operator shall continue to report the event category and recommended default protective measures on a regular basis throughout the emergency to the designated provincial and municipal contact points. These reports shall serve as input into PEOC Command decision-making.
      11. The BNGS operator cannot terminate or cancel a notification once it has been made. Such a notification shall automatically lapse when the provincial response to it is formally terminated (see Paragraph 4.2.3 below).
      12. Contact Points
        1. Contact points and phone numbers shall be pre-determined and routinely validated to ensure availability.
        2. The provincial contact point shall be the PEOC Duty Officer.
        3. The following municipal contact points shall be set out in the municipal plans:
          1. A contact point to receive an initial notification anytime, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.
          2. A municipal emergency response staff person who can be contacted anytime 24 hours per day, 7 days per week for passage of information and monitoring of the situation following the initiation of a notification.
    2. Initial Provincial and Municipal Response

      1. The initial provincial response to a notification from BNGS shall depend on the category (and other relevant information) contained in the notification message (see Table 4.1).
      2. Within 15 minutes of the receipt of an initial notification, the PEOC Commander shall decide on the initial response level to be adopted and inform the municipal contact point(s). This level should normally be the one linked to the category of the notification received (see Table 4.2) unless another level is judged to be more appropriate.
      3. The PEOC Commander or PEOC Operations Chief may adopt another provincial response level as appropriate including termination of the provincial response. All stakeholders shall be notified of any such change.
      4. The initial (and any subsequent) response level to be adopted by the Municipalities and other organizations shall be communicated by the PEOC Commander (see Paragraph 4.2.2 above) to all stakeholders. The general municipal response for each level is outlined in Table 4.2; the specific response shall be described in the municipal plans.
    3. Internal Notifications

      1. Each organization or agency required to respond to a nuclear emergency shall have an internal notification system to inform all concerned staff of the imminence or occurrence of an emergency under this plan, and of the appropriate response to the notification.
      2. Each jurisdiction and organization receiving a notification of an activation response (either partial or full) shall issue an appropriate internal notification to its units and individuals who are required to respond. The notification shall indicate the level of activation to be adopted.
      3. The PEOC and each jurisdiction and organization required to respond and issue an internal or external notification (see Section 4.4 below) shall prepare a notification procedure and list of recipients.
      4. PEOC Notifications
        1. If the PEOC is to be activated (whether fully or partially), then the PEOC Commander shall issue an appropriate notification (including an indication of the level of activation) to at least one pre-designated contact point in each of the following jurisdictions and organizations:
          1. Municipality of Kincardine
          2. each provincial-level organization required to respond to the emergency
          3. Host Municipalities
          4. Bruce Nuclear Generating Station
        2. Additionally, the PEOC Commander shall notify:
          1. PEOC staff
          2. Emergency Information Section staff
    4. External Notifications

      1. Additional organizations or agencies which might be affected by a nuclear emergency under this plan, or which may be required to assist in responding to it, should be notified at an appropriate stage by their links in the Emergency Response Organization. As such, upon adoption of an activation response (partial or full), external notifications shall be carried out as detailed below. The notification must indicate the level of activation being adopted.
      2. The PEOC Commander shall ensure the following are notified:
        1. the federal Government Operations Centre (GOC) and the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP) Duty Officer who shall then complete the notifications listed in Paragraph 4.4.3 below
        2. the Province of Quebec (Sûreté du Quebec)
        3. the State of New York Emergency Management Agency
        4. Canadian Coast Guard (which shall notify the US Coast Guard under agreed protocols)
        5. the State of Ohio Emergency Management Agency
        6. the State of Michigan Emergency Management Agency
        7. Canada News Wire/National Alert Aggregation and Dissemination System (NAADS)
        8. Bell Canada
        9. wireless phone providers
      3. As directed by the FNEP Duty Officer, the federal Government Operations Centre (GOC) shall notify: 
        1. Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
        2. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
        3. Privy Council Office (PCO)
        4. Transport Canada
        5. Department of National Defence (DND)
        6. Canadian Coast Guard
        7. CNSC Duty Officer
        8. Global Affairs Canada
        9. Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)
        10. Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
        11. Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC)
        12. Air Traffic Control
        13. CN Rail
        14. CP Rail
        15. U.S. Department of Homeland Security
        16. international organizations under existing agreements, conventions and departmental emergency plans
      4. Other agencies and organizations shall be notified by the following:
        1. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs shall notify the Dairy Farmers of Ontario.
        2. Ministry of Community and Social Services shall notify the Red Cross, Ontario Zone.
        3. Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry shall notify:
          1. Central Lake Ontario Conservation Office
          2. Toronto and Region Conservation Office
        4. Municipal plans shall include provisions for the following external notifications:
          1. Bruce County
          2. Town of Saugeen Shores
          3. Bluewater Board of Education
          4. Grey-Bruce County Catholic District School Board
          5. paramedic services
          6. Inverhuron Provincial Park
          7. Brucedale Conservation Area
          8. Bruce Municipal Telephone System
          9. local utilities (e.g., hydro, gas, water)
          10. local branches of voluntary organizations
    5. Provincial Response Levels

      1. The provincial response level adopted depends on the notification category received from BNGS (see Table 4.2).
      2. Reportable Event and Abnormal Incident
        1. In the event of a Reportable Event notification from BNGS the provincial response level adopted should be Routine Monitoring, unless the PEOC Commander decides otherwise.
        2. In the event of an Abnormal Incident notification from BNGS, the provincial response level adopted should be Enhanced Monitoring, unless the PEOC Commander decides otherwise.
        3. In these cases, the notifications and level of staffing shall proceed according to Table 4.2, unless the PEOC Commander decides otherwise.
        4. The PEOC Commander shall ensure the applicable stakeholders are notified when a response to a Reportable Event or Abnormal Incident has been terminated.
      3. On-site Emergency

        An On-site Emergency can result in either a partial or full activation provincial response (see Figure 4.1 or Figure 4.2), depending on the source of the accident and the prospects for the resulting emission:

        1. An On-site Emergency with no emission occurring shall normally result in a partial activation response.
        2. An On-site Emergency with a (non-reactor) emission occurring or expected within 12 hours shall normally result in a full activation response.
      4. General Emergency

        A General Emergency notification from BNGS shall result in a full activation response (see Figure 4.2) as it denotes an emission from a reactor can result due to fuel and containment failures.

      5. The remainder of this chapter therefore deals with the operational response to an accident at BNGS which results in, or has the potential to result in, an emission of radioactive material to the atmosphere, and therefore requires a partial or full activation response.
      6. The partial and full activation response to a nuclear emergency is described below in relation to the 3 successive phases defined by the PNERP Master Plan, Section 5.9.
      Flowchart showing sequence of provincial response actions including public alerting, emergency bulletins, declaration of an emergency and ordering precautionary measures when an On-Site Emergency notification has been received.
Figure 4.1: Initial Provincial Response to an On-Site Emergency Notification
Figure 4.2: Initial Provincial Response to a General Emergency Notification
Flowchart showing sequence of provincial response actions including public alerting, emergency bulletins, declaration of an emergency and ordering precautionary measures when a General Emergency notification has been received.
  • Early Phase Response

    1. The early phase:
      1. Begins with an initial notification of an emergency prior to, or during a radioactive release.
      2. Lasts anywhere from hours to days and in the event of, an ongoing or imminent emission, should involve the implementation of automatic default protective measures (see Table 4.3).
      3. Ends when the radioactive release is brought under control and reliable environmental radiation monitoring is available to be used for protective action decision-making.
      4. Shall be terminated and the intermediate phase shall begin based on the criteria in Section 4.7 below.
    2. The operational response in this phase differs depending on whether the initial provincial response level is partial or full activation.
    3. Partial Activation
      1. A PEOC partial activation response (see Figure 4.1) is adopted when it is expected that a radioactive release will occur at some point in the future and therefore protective or operational measures (other than monitoring and assessment of the situation) are not likely to be required within 36 hours.
      2. When the PEOC is partially activated, initial actions include:
        1. Notification of the emergency management organization and set up and full staffing of the PEOC and the Municipal EOCs to monitor and assess the situation on a continuous basis.
        2. Activation of the Ministry EOCs and Unified Transportation Coordination Centre and staffing as appropriate to the situation.
        3. Activation of the Emergency Information Centres (EICs) with staffing at an appropriate level. Provincial staff to be dispatched, as appropriate.
        4. All emergency response personnel not immediately required should be placed on standby. This provision should ensure that personnel can be quickly contacted when needed to report to their duty stations.
        5. Other emergency centres should be readied to a level where they can become fully operational without undue delay, when required. Specific levels of readiness shall be described in the municipal plans.
        6. Consideration shall be given to issuing an emergency bulletin(s) and news release(s).
      3. Technical assessments of the accident situation and projected radiation doses shall be carried out on a regular basis by the PEOC Science Section, as described in Section 4.6.5 below.
      4. The technical assessments carried out by the PEOC Science Section, as well as inputs from the other PEOC sections shall be compiled by the PEOC Planning Section Chief into recommendations for protective action decision-making, to the PEOC Commander.
      5. The PEOC Commander, in consultation with the PEOC Command Section and select stakeholder organizations (including MOHLTC, Designated Municipalities and others deemed appropriate), shall consider and decide on the need for operational measures as well as future protective actions and ensure that all stakeholders are so informed.
      6. If the emergency situation is resolved and the potential for off-site consequences is eliminated, the PEOC Commander shall downgrade the provincial response level, as appropriate.
      7. Alternatively, the PEOC Commander shall upgrade the response level to full activation when a radioactive emission seems likely to occur in 36 hours or less or, as deemed appropriate.
    4. Full Activation
      1. A PEOC full activation response should be adopted as a result of:
        1. An initial notification from BNGS stating that an emission is ongoing or imminent (On-site or General Emergency), or
        2. An escalation of an existing emergency situation, where an emission is now expected in 36 hours or less
      2. The following actions shall be initiated upon adoption of a full activation response:
        1. All emergency operations centres, Emergency Information Centres, Reception Centres, Evacuation Centres, Emergency Worker Centres and Monitoring and Decontamination Units are fully staffed and operational.
        2. All emergency response personnel from Paragraph i. above immediately report to their places of duty.
        3. Public alerting is initiated and emergency bulletins issued concurrently (see Sections 6.2 and 6.4).
        4. Operational directives (or emergency orders) issued for protective actions per c) or d) below, as appropriate.
        5. PEOC Commander advises government of the need for a provincial emergency declaration (see PNERP Master Plan Section 1.5.1).
        6. Provincial Chief Emergency Information Officer (PCEIO) shall consider establishing a Joint Information Centre as necessary (see Paragraph 6.5.2 e)).
      3. Where the full activation response level is adopted as a result of an initial notification from BNGS that an emission is ongoing or imminent (see Paragraph (a) (i) above), the default actions noted in Table 4.3 shall be implemented, unless there are good reasons for modifying the response. This default response is undertaken due to the potential lack of detailed information or plant data together with a lack of available time for analysis.
      4. Where an escalating event results in the upgrade to a full activation response (see Paragraph (a) (ii) above), data gathering and analysis are already being undertaken by the emergency response organization, with a protective action decision-making process in place. Therefore, in this escalating type of scenario, the technical and operational assessments and the recommendation process (see Section 4.6.5 below) replaces the need for default actions.
    5. PEOC Science Section Technical Assessments

      In the early phase, prior to or during a radioactive emission, the PEOC Science Section shall undertake technical assessments in accordance with PEOC Scientific Section procedures which shall serve as input into the PEOC Planning Section recommendations for Command decision-making. Examples of technical assessments include:

      1. Accident Assessments

        The Nuclear Incident Group (NIG) of the PEOC Scientific Section shall receive hourly plant status and data from the BNGS EOC, through agreed to transmission systems (and backup), and shall on an ongoing basis:

        1. Evaluate the status of relevant station systems and make ongoing assessments of possible accident progressions, considering both positive and negative outcomes (see paragraph ii below).
        2. Monitor the progress of station vacuum structure repressurization and continually forecast the date and time when its pressure could reach, firstly, the minimum level required for the Filtered Air Discharge System (FADS) operation and, secondly, the level at which FADS operation becomes necessary.
        3. Analyze venting data and make projections to inform venting decision-making by the PEOC Commander and stakeholders (see Section 4.6.6 below).
        4. Liaise with EMC staff and undertake a technical projection of the maximum distance from the reactor facility at which the generic criteria (see PNERP Master Plan, Annex E, Appendix 1) for protective measures against the plume are likely to be reached during the anticipated duration of the emission (allowance should be made for the effects of early venting, if applicable):
          • evacuation
          • sheltering-in-place
          • iodine thyroid blocking
      2. Condition of Station Systems
        1. Table 4.3 describes four main categories for the condition of station systems along with some examples of each. It can provide a baseline for making appropriate judgements or, if time and adequate information are not available, it may be used to determine default measures.
        2. In an actual event, the estimate of station conditions may not conform exactly to the various sets of conditions given in Table 4.3. In such a case, the default protective measures listed in the table, may be appropriately modified.
        3. The PEOC Scientific Section Chief shall determine and make recommendations to the PEOC Commander for approval on:
          • the set of protective measures that best match the current conditions
          • whether current meteorological conditions warrant any change to the distance out to which protective measures are advised
          • the DPZ and CPZ response sectors likely to be affected by the emission
      3. Exposure Levels

        The PEOC Scientific Section shall make an assessment as to whether the dose in any sector(s) is likely to require the activation of the Radiation Health Response Plan (see Paragraph 6.9.7).

      4. Subsequent Technical Assessments

        As more data and projections become available, the PEOC Scientific Section shall continuously update the assessments made in order to establish whether any additional protective measures are required.

    6. Venting of Containment
      1. During a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the holdup period of any radioactive material within the station containment structure (e.g., vacuum building) permits the venting of said contained radioactivity in a controlled manner and in a safe direction, i.e., over the lake (refer to PNERP Master Plan, Annex G).
      2. During a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA), the holdup period of any radioactive material may be significantly reduced and radioactive material may be released in an uncontrolled manner. BDBAs are categorized as General Emergencies and as such the PEOC assumes full activation as described in Section 4.6.4 above.
      3. For all accidents, the PEOC Commander may decide at any time to upgrade to full activation as conditions warrant however the Commander should upgrade no later than 36 hours prior to venting.
      4. For all accidents, the BNGS operator shall include, in each hourly report to the PEOC, an estimate of the time at which the vacuum building pressure would reach the minimum level at which the filtered air discharge system (FADS) can be operated.
      5. The time interval between the occurrence of the accident and containment pressure reaching this minimum level may depend on the condition and behaviour of the containment system. With no impairment to containment, this time interval is expected to be about 2 ½ days (an impaired containment could significantly reduce that time).
      6. For all accidents, the BNGS operator shall consult with the Province, Designated Municipalities and CNSC before undertaking any venting activity, unless venting must be performed in an urgent manner to protect the structural integrity of containment (see Paragraph 2.6.4 b)). In such a case, every effort shall be made to inform these stakeholders as early as possible.
      7. The PEOC Commander should consider, in consultation with the BNGS operator, the CNSC, and Municipality of Kincardine, whether venting over Lake Huron (according to the considerations in the PNERP Master Plan, Annex G), would be feasible and advisable.  Detailed procedures for such decision-making should be developed in consultation with the above agencies and incorporated in the PEOC procedures for the PEOC Scientific, Operations and Command Sections, as appropriate.
      8. Environmental Radiation Monitoring

        If venting over Lake Huron, ground monitoring teams from BNGS shall complete radiological surveys following the shoreline, out to 20 km on either side of the plant to detect any “blow back” of radioactivity towards land during venting. Any radioactivity detected shall be immediately reported by the BNGS operator to the PEOC.

    7. Early Phase Protective Action Decision-Making
      1. The PEOC Science Section’s technical assessment of the situation should produce a projection of the maximum distance from BNGS at which the generic criteria for evacuation, sheltering-in-place and KI ingestion are likely to be reached during the anticipated duration of the emission.
      2. The PEOC Planning Section shall undertake an evaluation of this technical assessment, taking into account operational and public policy considerations, and shall prepare a preliminary assessment regarding the need to implement these measures, proposed timings, and the area within which these measures should be taken.
      3. These assessments shall be continually updated and, as soon as a reasonably certain picture of the evacuation (and other protective measures) distance is achieved, the PEOC, through the Command Section, shall consult with applicable stakeholders (Designated Municipalities, host and support Municipalities, federal departments, the reactor facility).
      4. Command decisions on protective action shall be communicated to the emergency response organization (see PEOC Command Section procedures) and the applicable emergency bulletin(s) shall be issued (per PEOC Operations Section procedures).
  • Intermediate Phase Response

    1. The intermediate phase begins once the radioactive release has been brought under control and reliable environmental radiation monitoring is available for use in protective action decision-making.
    2. Following the radioactive emission, the PEOC Scientific Section’s input into the protective action decision-making process shall no longer be based on modelling the projected doses or on default measures but rather on the tangible results of environmental radiation monitoring.
    3. The PEOC Scientific Section shall undertake, and continuously update, the following assessments:
      1. Off-site environmental radiation monitoring undertaken by the ERAMG shall produce a picture of the contamination situation.
      2. The PEOC Scientific Section Chief shall make technical recommendations for protective action (exposure and ingestion control measures) based on the results of the actual contamination levels as compared against the Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) (per the PNERP Master Plan, Annex E, Appendix 2).
      3. The PEOC Scientific Section Chief shall make recommendations regarding sector safety status on behalf of emergency workers operating in the area.
      4. The intermediate phase operations of the PEOC Scientific Section shall be detailed in the Scientific Section procedures.
    4. Intermediate Phase Protective Action Decision-Making
      1. The PEOC Planning Section shall undertake an assessment of these Scientific Section technical recommendations, in light of operational and public policy considerations, and shall prepare recommendations for the PEOC Commander regarding the protective measures, areas where they should be implemented, and implementation timings.
      2. These assessments shall be continually updated and, as soon as a reasonably certain picture of the evacuation (and other protective measures) distance is achieved, the PEOC Commander shall advise all stakeholders of the protective action strategy to be undertaken. If time is available, the PEOC Commander shall undertake prior consultation with applicable stakeholders on the protective action strategy recommendations.
      3. Planning for the management of radioactive waste (see Section 6.11) generated by the emergency should preferably begin during the intermediate phase.
  • Transition to the Recovery Phase

    1. During the recovery phase actions will commence to restore the affected area to pre-emergency conditions and to scale back the emergency response organization.
    2. As there may not be a clear distinction between phases, with emergency response operations occurring in all three, planning for recovery should begin as soon as practical.
    3. Stakeholder recovery plans should include measures to address the following as applicable to their organization:
      1. recovery organization structure
      2. care for persons exposed or contaminated
      3. long-term relocation
      4. resettlement and return of evacuees
      5. long-term support for those living in contaminated areas
      6. decontamination and reconstruction of property damaged during the emergency
      7. economic impact issues and improvement plans
    4. Stakeholder recovery plans should be prepared in advance and conform to the provincial recovery plan.

Table 4.1: Initial Notification Categories and Criteria

Table showing notification categories, applicable criteria and operatoinal examples of each.
CATEGORY CRITERIA (Alternative) EXAMPLES
REPORTABLE EVENT

1. Any event or condition that reduces the reactor facility’s capability to mitigate an emergency on-site, and which persists for longer than the allowable time limits.

1A. Level 1 or 2 impairment of a special safety system, which persists for more than 4 hours.

1B. Entry into emergency operating procedures.

2. Any event or condition that reduces the reactor facility’s capability to provide the agreed off-site emergency support, and which is expected to persist for over 8 hours, or actually does so.

2. Reduced ability to:

A.  Carry out off-site field monitoring.

B.  Provide source term data.

C.  Provide required off-site ERO staff.

3. Natural, toxic, flammable, destructive or other phenomena which have the potential to lead to a minor* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary or the moderator system.

3A. Equipment failure.

3B. Extreme environmental conditions.

3C. Earthquake.

3D. Fire or explosion.

4. Unexpected or unplanned activation of the emergency cooling injection system or the containment system (including box-up). 

4A. Unexpected or unplanned activation of the ECI system component that does not result in injection.

4B. Unexpected or unplanned activation of the containment system.

4C. Excludes events initiated during testing.

5. Declaration of a Station Emergency, with no potential for off-site effects.

5. As per nuclear emergency procedures.

6. Any credible publicly announced threat to, or attempted or actual breach of, the facility’s security that threatens its safe operation.

6A. A publicized bomb threat.

6B. A breach or attempted breach of the protected area.

ABNORMAL INCIDENT

1. A minor* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary with no fuel failures (actual or likely).

2. Natural, toxic, flammable, destructive or other phenomena which have the potential to lead to the major* break specified in Item 1 under On-Site Emergency.

3. Activation of the emergency cooling injection system or the containment system (including box-up) due to a process system upset which is not reportable under any other category.

4. Declaration of a Station Emergency due to an occurrence which has the potential to result in off-site effects.

1.   LOCA on one or more units, without fuel failures and with or without containment impairment.

2.   Similar causes as for # 3 under REPORTABLE EVENT

3A. Activation of the ECI system component that results in injection.

3B. Activation of the containment system on high activity or pressure.

ON-SITE EMERGENCY

(Note: A notification with this category must state whether an emission is ongoing or, if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence).

1. A major* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary, the moderator system, or the irradiated (or spent) fuel handling and storage system, with fuel failures* but with a fully intact and functioning containment system.

2. An abnormal emission* of radioactive material to the atmosphere from any non-reactor source.

3. An event or condition which has the potential to lead to a General Emergency criterion, concurrent with the loss of the ability to detect or control such a development.

4. Hostile action in the protected area resulting in actual or potential loss of control over station safety or safety related systems but excluding reactor control systems.

1A. LOCA with fuel failures on one or more units.

1B. Fuelling machine accident.

2.   Spent fuel bay accident.

3A. Loss of all AC power.

3B. Extreme environmental conditions.

3C. Earthquake damage.

3D. Fire or explosion.

3E. Entry requirements met for SAMG or EME to maintain fuel cooling.

GENERAL EMERGENCY

(Note: A notification with this category must state whether an emission is ongoing or, if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence).

1. Damage to reactor fuel leading to the release of radioactivity from the fuel coincident with the failure, impairment, or bypass of containment, resulting in an atmospheric emission or, a reasonable expectation of an emission within the next 12 hours.

2. Hostile action in the protected area resulting in actual or imminent loss of the ability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown state.

1. LOCA with actual or imminent fuel failures on one or more units and impaired containment.

2. Inability to control or maintain reactivity control or fuel cooling.

*To be defined in reactor facility procedures.

Table 4.2: Initial Provincial and Municipal Response

Table showing notiification categories, along with initial provincial and municipal response actions.
INITIAL NOTIFICATION INITIAL PROVINCIAL RESPONSE INITIAL MUNICIPAL RESPONSE
REPORTABLE EVENT

ROUTINE MONITORING

  1. Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) shall notify the municipal contact point(s), reactor facility operator, and others as appropriate, and shall monitor the situation.
  2. PEOC Scientific staff is consulted, if appropriate.
  3. If and when appropriate, Emergency Information Section (EIS) staff issues news release(s).

Emergency response staff remain in contact with the PEOC, and monitor event.

ABNORMAL INCIDENT

ENHANCED MONITORING

  1. PEOC should adopt Enhanced Monitoring and shall inform the municipal contact point(s), reactor facility operator, and any other organizations affected.
  2. External notifications to Michigan, New York, Ohio and Quebec are made.
  3. PEOC to set up a duty team consisting of operations staff, scientific staff, reactor facility operator representative(s), EIS staff, and others as required.
  4. If and when appropriate, EIS staff shall issue news release(s).
  5. Provincial staff are notified to remain available to report in for duty.

Emergency response staff monitor event, preferably from Municipal Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs).

 

ON-SITE EMERGENCY

(No emission occurring)

PARTIAL ACTIVATION

  1. PEOC should adopt partial activation response (for details, see Section 4.6.3), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively), including the municipal contact points and the host communities.
  2. If a reactor emission is expected to occur in 36 hours or less, PEOC should consider adopting full activation response and consider the need to implement the immediate measures per General Emergency below.
  3. PEOC shall be fully staffed. Consideration shall be given to issuing an emergency bulletin (Section 6.4), news release or both.
  4. Ministry EOCs and Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC) to be established and appropriately staffed.
  1. Issue notification placing municipal Emergency Response Organization on standby.
  2. Municipal EOCs fully staffed.
  3. Emergency Information Centres (EICs) to be established.
  4. Other emergency centres readied to become operational without undue delay.

ON-SITE EMERGENCY

(Emission Ongoing or expected within 12 hours)

FULL ACTIVATION

  1. PEOC should notify and require the municipal contacts to activate the public alerting system (Section 6.2).
  2. PEOC should adopt full activation (Section 4.6.4), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively), including the host community.
  3. PEOC shall issue the appropriate emergency bulletin (Section 6.4).
  4. PEOC shall issue operational directives implementing the following operational measures, unless there are good reasons for modifying this response, for:
    1. Sheltering (Section 5.3.4) in the Automatic Action Zone.
    2. Suspension of road and rail traffic through the Automatic Action Zone.
    3. Clearance of all boaters in Lake Sector 7.
  5. PEOC shall assess the situation for further action.
  6. PEOC shall issue further emergency bulletins, as appropriate (Section 6.4).
  7. EIS staff shall issue news releases, as appropriate.
  8. UTCC and Ministry EOCs shall be established.
  1. Initiate public alerting.
  2. Issue notification activating municipal Emergency Response Organization.
  3. Municipal EOCs, EICs and other centres to be activated and operational.
  4. Implement operational directives, as issued by the PEOC.

GENERAL

EMERGENCY

(Emission ongoing or expected within 12 hours)

FULL ACTIVATION

  1. PEOC shall notify and ensure that the municipal contacts have activated the public alerting system (Section 6.2).
  2. PEOC shall issue the appropriate emergency bulletin (Section 6.4).
  3. PEOC shall issue operational directives implementing the following operational measures for:
    1. Suspension of road, rail and air traffic throughout the Automatic Action Zone.
    2. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone and Lake Sectors 7 through 9 unless there are good reasons for modifying this response.
    3. Precautionary measures in the DPZ.
  4. If emission is ongoing or, if evacuations will not be completed prior to emission, issue operational directives implementing the operational measures for:
    1. Evacuees to report for radiation monitoring or, if not possible, to evacuate to a destination beyond the DPZ and to undertake self-decontamination.
    2. Ingestion of KI pills (Section 5.3.3 ) in the Automatic Action Zone.
    3. Sheltering (Section 5.3.4) in the rest of the Detailed Planning Zone. Otherwise, take this action 4 hours (or, at a time deemed appropriate) before the expected time of commencement of the emission.
  5. PEOC shall adopt full activation (Section 4.6.4), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively), including the host community.
  6. PEOC shall assess the situation for further action.
  7. PEOC shall issue further emergency bulletins, as appropriate (Section 6.4).
  8. EIS staff shall issue news releases, as appropriate.
  9. Ministry EOCs and UTCC to be established.
  1. Initiate public alerting.
  2. Issue notification activating municipal Emergency Response Organization.
  3. Municipal EOCs, EICs and other centres activated and fully staffed.
  4. Implement operational directives, as issued by the PEOC.

Table 4.3: Default Protective Measures

Table showing examples of station system impairment conditions and the corresponding default protective measures that should be issued as operational directives.
CONDITION OF STATION SYSTEMS EXAMPLES DEFAULT PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Issue Immediate Operational Directives

A.     Intermediate to severe core damage with an accompanying loss of the containment function.

Either:

  1. Failure of reactor shutdown, or
  2. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
  3. LOCA causing early flow stagnation in a core pass.

Combined with either:

  1. Large hole in the containment envelope (e.g., airlock doors open, multiple airlock seal failures), or
  2. An emission pathway bypassing containment.
  1. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone, all other Detailed Planning Zone sectors likely to be affected by the emission, and the area beyond the Detailed Planning Zone likely to be affected by the emission up to a distance of 20 km from the reactor.
  2. Iodine Thyroid Blocking: All evacuees from the Detailed Planning Zone to ingest a KI dose.
  3. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees from the Detailed Planning Zone to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring or to self-decontaminate at destination.
  4. Sheltering: All sectors likely to be affected by the emission, which are not immediately evacuating, to shelter. Also, all sectors and areas adjacent (in the same ring) to sectors and areas being evacuated should shelter-in-place.

B.     Intermediate level of core damage and a loss of the filtered pathway.

Either:

  1. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
  2. LOCA and failure of emergency coolant recovery.

Combined with either:

  1. Containment envelope impairment resulting in loss of pressure control, or
  2. Impairment of the FADS, including a reduction in filter efficiency.

  1. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone and all other Detailed Planning Zone sectors likely to be affected by the emission.
  2. Iodine Thyroid Blocking: All evacuees to ingest a KI dose.
  3. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring (ongoing emission only) or to self-decontaminate at destination.
  4. Sheltering: All sectors likely to be affected by the emission, which are not immediately evacuating, to shelter. Also, all sectors adjacent (in the same ring) to those being evacuated should shelter-in-place.

C.     Intermediate to severe fuel damage with containment envelope impairment leading to early venting.

Either:

  1. LOCA causing flow stagnation in a core pass, or
  2. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
  3. LOCA and failure of emergency coolant recovery, or
  4. End-fitting or other failure and fuel ejection from a channel, or
  5. LOCA in fuelling machine.

Combined with:

A loss of containment pressure control requiring early venting.

  1. Evacuation of the Automatic Action Zone and all sectors in the Inner Ring likely to be affected by the emission.
  2. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring (ongoing emission only) or to self-decontaminate at destination.
  3. Sheltering: All sectors in the Inner Ring adjacent to those being evacuated should shelter-in-place. Sectors beyond this zone likely to be affected by the emission to also shelter-in-place.

D.     All other events or conditions likely to lead to an emission.

Spent fuel bay accident.

  1. Sheltering the Automatic Action Zone and evacuate Lake Sector 7.
    1. Protective Action Response Strategy

      During the response to a nuclear emergency, the PEOC shall implement a protective action response strategy to protect the public and responding emergency workers from the effects of a radioactive emission. Protective actions include:

      1. precautionary measures
      2. exposure control protective measures
      3. ingestion control protective measures
      4. additional measures to protect the public
    2. Precautionary Measures

      The PEOC Commander shall direct as appropriate, any or all of the following precautionary measures in the Detailed Planning Zone (or part thereof) and adjacent areas (e.g., CPZ).  Consideration shall also be given to the most suitable timing for the measures (in the case of a delayed emission it may be appropriate to delay the application of some of them) and issue the necessary bulletin(s) and directions for their implementation. These measures are:

      1. closing of beaches, recreation areas, etc.
      2. closing of workplaces and schools
      3. suspension of admissions of non-critical patients in hospitals
      4. entry control (see Section 6.6)
      5. clearing the milk storage of dairy farms
      6. banning consumption of any item of food or water that may have been exposed outdoors
      7. banning consumption and export of locally produced milk, meat, produce, milk-and meat-producing animals
      8. removing milk- and meat-producing animals from outside pasture and exposed water sources
    3. Exposure Control Protective Measures

      1. Evacuation
        1. Evacuation time estimates (see Section 2.6.3) should be used to inform decision-making regarding the implementation of evacuation strategies.
        2. All available routes will be utilized to evacuate the public. 
        3. Shadow evacuations may occur spontaneously in areas contiguous to the Detailed Planning Zone and subsequently contribute to the Detailed Planning Zone evacuation time.
        4. Contamination
          1. In the event of a delayed emission, evacuees are not expected to be contaminated nor require monitoring and decontamination.
          2. In the event of an ongoing or imminent emission, evacuees exposed to the radioactive emission can be expected to have varying levels of contamination.
          3. Contamination, where found, would be in the form of loose particulate on people, their belongings and vehicles.
          4. Internal contamination may be present in individuals exposed to a radioactive emission.
          5. Given the population density, self-decontamination may be the primary means of decontamination, if required.
          6. Monitoring and decontamination facilities are required for those evacuees who are not be able to self-decontaminate as well as for those who desire assurance monitoring.
        5. Transportation
          1. During a nuclear emergency, traffic density and volume on major arterial roads and highways are significantly increased and therefore, travel times in all directions are significantly longer than normal.
          2. Integrated and multi-model transportation management is required to ensure that evacuations can proceed as smoothly as possible.
        6. Family Reunification Prior to Evacuation
          1. Families will want to reunite and evacuate together, as far as practical.
          2. The feasibility of family reunification depends on the time of day at the onset of the emergency and on the urgency for evacuations to proceed (i.e., timing of the emission).
          3. Factors affecting family reunification include workplace location, school children, residents of hospitals, long-term care homes or other institutions, etc.
        7. Mass Care
          1. The majority of evacuees will make their own arrangements for care and lodging.  Mass care arrangements are required for those evacuees without such resources.
          2. Evacuees requiring public or privately provided accommodation, may need assurances that these accommodations are not contaminated.
        8. Protection and Care of Animals
          1. Pursuant to Section 7.0.2. (4), of the EMCPA, Municipal emergency response plans should make provisions for the protection and care of all animals, including those left behind during an evacuation
          2. Designated Municipalities should request assistance as necessary from the following to develop plans for the protection and care of animals:
            • Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (OSPCA) (whose mandate is to protect all animals in Ontario)
            • OMAFRA (provincial lead on farm animal disease (OIC 1157/2009))
            • the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (MNR) for issues pertaining to wildlife
          3. The PEOC should provide assistance to the stakeholders above as required for the protection and care of animals.
        9. Directing Evacuations
          1. Evacuations should be directed by response sector or planning zone ring of sectors and include information detailing the boundaries of the evacuation area by readily identifiable roads or landmarks.
          2. Evacuees who may have been exposed to an emission shall be directed either to proceed to a Monitoring and Decontamination Unit (MDU) or to self-decontaminate upon reaching their destination.  Information on locations for monitoring shall be provided at the time of the emergency.
          3. Evacuees who are not at risk of being contaminated shall be instructed to leave the Detailed Planning Zone and not be directed to an MDU or to self-decontaminate.
          4. Evacuees shall be permitted to evacuate the affected area in the direction and to the destination of their choosing, subject to restrictions (due to weather, traffic conditions etc.) announced by the PEOC Commander through the emergency bulletins.
          5. The responsibility for the expeditious movement ‎of evacuees via the provincial transportation network is identified in the Unified Transportation Management Plan.
          6. The Unified Transportation Coordination Centre shall monitor the provincial transportation network utilized by evacuees and inform the PEOC Commander of any issues impacting the evacuation.
        10. Evacuation Arrangements
          1. The Municipality of Kincardine’s emergency plan shall include arrangements for mass evacuation transportation and medical transfers.
          2. The evacuation of the affected public should be facilitated by the planning and preparedness undertaken in advance, including:
            • transportation management (e.g., Ministry of Transportation)
            • reception and evacuation centres (e.g., Designated Municipalities)
            • long-term housing (e.g., multi-ministry and multi-jurisdictional planning group)
            • health issues (led by the Local Public Health Units and Medical Officers of Health in conjunction with the MOHLTC, Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs) and Paramedic Services)
          3. Medical assistance required during an evacuation is the responsibility of the emergency medical services and hospitals under municipal arrangements and should be detailed in the municipal plans.
          4. Designated Municipalities and Host Municipalities shall include provisions for the reception and care of evacuees in their emergency plans.
          5. The BNGS operator shall include provisions for the monitoring and decontamination of evacuees in its emergency plan and associated procedures (see Section 6.9).
          6. Emergency plans of the schools in the Detailed Planning Zone should provide for the movement of staff and students to pre-arranged host schools and, if necessary, to Monitoring and Decontamination Units for prior monitoring and decontamination. Evacuated students are the responsibility of their school staff until collected from the host school by their guardians, or parents.
          7. Emergency plans of hospitals, long-term care homes, and other institutions in the Detailed Planning Zone should include provisions for the transfer of staff/residents/patients to an appropriate facility outside the Detailed Planning Zone, with which prior arrangements have been made. Provisions should also be made to take staff/residents/patients to Monitoring and Decontamination Units, if necessary.
          8. As it may not be possible or desirable to evacuate some of these persons, special arrangements shall be made for the care of staff/residents/patients remaining behind, as identified in the municipal plans.
        11. Bruce Nuclear Generating Station (BNGS) - Evacuation

          BNGS prepares its own evacuation plans for non-essential on-site personnel. During an emergency, the actual evacuation of on-site personnel should be carried out in consultation with the PEOC Commander. Where time permits without compromising the safety of station staff (i.e., delayed or imminent emission), the timing and sequence of on-site evacuations should be agreed to in advance with the PEOC Commander.

      2. Temporary Relocation
        1. Temporary relocation:
          1. Is the displacement of people from their homes for a period beyond one week and up to one year to avoid chronic exposure to radiation, usually from ground contamination. Beyond one-year, the PEOC should consider permanent resettlement. 
          2. Can be directed post-release, during the intermediate response phase, based on actual measured contamination levels.
          3. Can be directed as a subsequent measure to evacuation, or sheltering-in-place, or as a separate measure.
          4. Is determined following analysis of environmental radiation monitoring results and assessment against Operational Intervention Levels (OILs; PNERP Master Plan Annex E, Appendix 2).
        2. The evacuation arrangements described in Section 5.3.1 j) above shall be considered and applied as appropriate for the implementation of temporary relocation.
        3. The PEOC should consider socioeconomic factors before recommending temporary relocation as the potential impacts of this action may not be justified in areas where the OIL for relocation is minimally exceeded.
      3. Iodine Thyroid Blocking
        1. It is the responsibility of the BNGS operator to procure adequate quantities of KI pills for the Detailed Planning Zone population (PNERP Master Plan, Section 6.5.2).
        2. Designated Municipalities shall detail in their plans the means by which they facilitate:
          1. Availability of KI pills for Detailed Planning Zone institutions and for emergency centres (Emergency worker, Reception and Evacuation Centres and MDUs).
          2. Availability of KI pills for any members of the Detailed Planning Zone population who may wish to possess a supply.
        3. Other operational responsibilities regarding iodine thyroid blocking (stocking, distribution and administration) are described in the Radiation Health Response Plan, as prepared by MOHLTC.
        4. The Chief Medical Officer of Health shall decide when to administer KI in consultation with the PEOC Commander.
      4. Sheltering-in-Place

        The need for future sheltering-in-place as a protective measure should be broadcast through the emergency bulletin as soon as that need is identified.  The timing to actually issue an operational directive for sheltering-in-place (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advise that emergency orders have been made) shall be ultimately made by the PEOC Commander (as a general guidance, however, the emergency bulletin to direct this protective measure should be issued at least 4 hours prior to the expected emission time) following escalation to a full activation response.

    4. Ingestion Control Measures

      1. Before an emission commences, appropriate ingestion control measures should be directed as a precaution within and, if necessary, areas adjacent to the Detailed Planning Zone (e.g., the CPZ).
      2. After an emission commences, precautionary ingestion control measures should be reviewed by the PEOC Scientific Section and adjusted as necessary once environmental monitoring results become available.
      3. If environmental monitoring indicates the need, appropriate ingestion control measures should be considered in areas known or suspected to be contaminated.
      4. Based on the data produced by ground monitoring, additional ingestion control measures should be considered, where necessary, while the original precautionary measures may be lifted where appropriate.
    5. Additional Measures

      to Protect the Public
      1. The PEOC Commander may recommend other, practical dose reduction measures to the public. Such measures may be implemented in combination with the measures described above or, may simply be recommended to provide an additional level of protection against possible radionuclides present in the air or on the ground but which do not meet the generic criteria or OILs. Such measures include:
        1. Respiratory protection, such as covering of the nose and mouth with available material that can filter particulates when present in the air.
        2. Self-decontamination, including removing and bagging contaminated clothing, showering, and decontaminating surfaces of critical areas and objects.
        3. Staying indoors to the extent that it is practical, e.g., only conducting outdoor tasks when necessary (e.g., seeking medical attention, buying foodstuff and necessities).
      2. Detailed advice regarding these measures shall be provided for in public awareness and education materials as well as in emergency bulletins.
    1. General

      1. Operational response strategies are employed during a nuclear emergency response in order to facilitate the implementation of protective measures against the effects of a radioactive emission.
      2. Responsibility and strategies for operational response implemented during a BNGS emergency are described below.
    2. Public Alerting

      1. Public Alerting System Activation and Responsibilities
        1. Whenever the public alerting system is to be activated, the PEOC Commander shall concurrently issue an emergency bulletin (see Section 6.4) to the broadcast media. The bulletin shall contain specific instructions on what actions the public should take and where to get more information. Emergency bulletins should be continuously repeated.
        2. In case of a General Emergency notification from BNGS stating that an emission is ongoing or imminent, the municipal contact points of the Designated Municipalities should immediately activate the public alerting system. Reference to any other authority is not required.
        3. In all other cases, the PEOC Commander shall decide when to activate the public alerting system and issue the necessary instructions to the Designated Municipalities.
      2. Public alerting systems used to implement this PNERP shall conform to the following principles:
        1. The Municipality of Kincardine, as a Designated Municipality in the BNGS Detailed Planning Zone (see PNERP Master Plan, Annex A) shall make provisions, in their nuclear emergency plans, for a public alerting system which shall ensure that their Automatic Action Zone populations that may be required to undertake the default or immediate protective measures of (e.g., sheltering-in-place, evacuation, and ingestion of KI) can be alerted within 15 minutes of initiation.
        2. Municipal plans shall detail how this requirement is met and, pursuant to Section 5 of the EMCPA, plans of Lower-tier Municipalities whose populations reside within the required alerting area, shall conform to the Municipal Plan.
        3. The Municipality of Kincardine and the province shall include provisions in their nuclear emergency response plans to coordinate the timing of public alerting, public direction and emergency information. This should ensure that the population receives timely and accurate information on what protective measures to take once they have been alerted of an emergency.
        4. The Municipality of Kincardine shall ensure an initial evaluation of any new public alerting system is completed to verify that the requirements under this PNERP are met. Further, regular integrated testing of existing public alerting systems shall be included as a component of municipal exercise programs.
        5. Where the public alerting area includes more than one Municipality, the selected system(s) shall be compatible or integrated in order to ensure consistency in timing, type of signal and other key implementation specifications.
        6. Such a public alerting system, coupled together with emergency bulletins, should ensure that the population within the Detailed Planning Zone is notified in an effective and timely manner.
      3. The public alerting system for a BNGS emergency shall, in addition to adhering to the principles in Section 6.2.2 above, meet the following requirements:
        1. The Municipality of Kincardine’s nuclear emergency response plan shall describe how the public alerting system has the capability to issue a public alert to practically 100%[5] of the population, located both indoors and outdoors, within the Automatic Action Zone, within 15 minutes[6].
        2. The Municipality of Kincardine’s nuclear emergency response plans shall describe how the public alerting system has the capability to issue a public alert to the population, located both indoors and outdoors, in the Detailed Planning Zone within 15 minutes.
        3. The provincial Alert Ready program shall also be used to alert all populations within and beyond the DPZ[7].
      4. The operators of the Bruce NGS, pursuant to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, shall provide resources and assistance to the Municipality of Kincardine to establish and maintain a public alerting system in their Detailed Planning Zone
    3. Technical Assessments - PEOC Scientific Section

      1. The PEOC Scientific Section is responsible for assessing the radiological consequences of the nuclear emergency through the operations of its Nuclear Incident Group (NIG) and the Environmental Radiation Assurance and Monitoring Group (ERAMG).
      2. In the early phase of the emergency the majority of the assessments undertaken shall be by the NIG (Section 4.6.5). The ERAMG shall be focussed on ensuring the availability of baseline radiation information.
      3. Once the emission has ceased, the ERAMG shall begin operations to determine the level and extent of radioactive contamination (Section 4.7.3).
    4. Public Direction - Emergency Bulletins

      1. The responsibility for issuing emergency bulletins rests with the PEOC Commander and may be delegated to the PEOC Operations Chief.
      2. The aim of public direction is to communicate, directly to the affected public through emergency bulletins, the direction and guidance regarding protective actions they should take in order to ensure their safety and welfare. Public direction principles are described in the PNERP Master Plan, Section 7.3.
      3. Emergency bulletins issued during a partial activation response level, before an emission is expected to occur, should be informative and permissive, whereas emergency bulletins issued once a full activation response has been adopted should be increasingly directive.
      4. While the need for future sheltering should be broadcast through emergency bulletin as soon as that need is identified, the actual sheltering directive should be made, via emergency bulletin, at least 4 hours prior to the expected emission time.
      5. At a partial activation response, the emergency bulletin shall include the following information, as applicable:
        1. date and time of expected emission
        2. sectors (by geographical description) which may be affected
        3. applicable precautionary and protective measures for the affected sectors or area and applicable timings (in the case of a delayed emission it may be appropriate to delay the application of some of them)
        4. public inquiry phone number(s) and websites
      6. As successive emergency bulletins are issued, as much additional information as possible should be provided which may encourage those who can leave early to evacuate.
      7. Once a full activation response level has been adopted and an emission is expected in 36 hours or less, emergency bulletins should ensure that they include directions regarding:
        1. date and time of expected emission
        2. precautionary measures directed in the applicable zone(s)
        3. protective measures and the affected sectors or zones
        4. Reception Centres which can receive evacuees without accommodation
        5. KI pill ingestion details and availability information, as applicable
        6. public inquiry phone number(s) and websites
      8. Marine Notification and Public Direction
        1. The PEOC Commander shall ensure the Canadian Coast Guard is notified whenever the PEOC receives a notification (partial or full activation) under this plan (see Paragraph 4.4.2 d)) and they, in turn, shall notify the U.S. Coast Guard.
        2. In the case of a full activation response, the Canadian Coast Guard shall broadcast an emergency message through their radio stations to marine craft on the marine radio channel. The message should notify all marine craft in the vicinity of the emergency and direct them to remain clear of the Detailed Planning Zone.
        3. Municipal plans shall detail how the South Bruce OPP Marine Unit assists in notifying and evacuating marine craft that do not have radios on board.
      9. The public awareness and education program for nuclear emergencies shall include information regarding the means by which public direction will be communicated.
    5. Emergency Public Information

      1. Lower Level Response

        When the off-site response adopted is Routine Monitoring or Enhanced Monitoring, (see Table 4.2), all news releases pertaining to the event and prepared on behalf of the province, shall be issued by the Director Communications Branch, MCSCS who acts as the Provincial Chief Emergency Information Office (PCEIO).

      2. Higher Level Response
        1. When the off-site response adopted is partial activation or full activation, (see Table 4.2), the Director of Communications Branch, MCSCS, assumes their role as PCEIO, establishing the provincial Emergency Information Section (EIS), on behalf of the province.
        2. The Designated Municipalities, the reactor facility operator and the federal government each have their own emergency information operations.
        3. In order to ensure the coordination and consistency of all emergency information issued to the public, all stakeholders should inform the provincial EIS if they plan to issue news releases or other emergency information materials.
        4. Stakeholders should coordinate the release and content of emergency information for public release with the provincial Emergency Information Section.
        5. Stakeholder emergency plans should include provisions for supporting the operation of a Joint Information Centre (JIC) if established by the PCEIO (e.g., public affairs/spokesperson).
      3. The Provincial Emergency Information Section (EIS)
        1. The provincial EIS, located in Toronto, shall ensure that the province’s emergency information is coordinated with the emergency information produced and disseminated by the Designated Municipalities, nuclear operator, federal partners and other stakeholders to ensure consistent messaging.
        2. Stakeholders should share emergency information prior to release wherever possible and practicable.
        3. The EIS functions include:
          1. Coordinating all of the provincial communications related to the nuclear emergency.
          2. Issuing provincial emergency information.
          3. Sharing and coordinating emergency information with Municipal EICs to ensure continuity and uniformity of messaging.
          4. Sharing copies of all news releases, fact sheets, and other public information materials with EICs prior to release to the public, if or when possible.
          5. Sending a liaison officer(s) to the Municipal EICs, if so requested.
      4. Municipal Emergency Information Centre (EIC)
        1. Emergency plans for the Designated Municipalities shall each describe how an EIC is established at a partial or full activation response.
        2. The EIC is responsible for the collection, dissemination and monitoring of local emergency information.
        3. The Designated Municipalities may invite the BNGS operator, neighbouring Municipalities, federal, and provincial liaison officers to participate in the EIC operation.
        4. The functions of the EIC include:
          1. Issuing news releases and other public information documents to the local media and residents describing the emergency and response measures.
          2. Keeping the provincial EIS and JIC informed regarding the development and distribution of news releases and other public information documents to local residents and media.
          3. Keeping the EIS apprised of local public perceptions, rumours, and reactions.
          4. Assisting media covering the emergency.
          5. Monitoring local media to ensure that local news is being correctly transmitted to the public by the media and confirming this with the EIS.
          6. Arranging media briefings, as required, to communicate “key messages” to the public.
      5. Public Inquiry
        1. Provincial public inquiries shall be coordinated by the EIS and include use of the Service Ontario’s hotline.
        2. The Designated Municipalities shall be responsible for establishing their own public inquiry operation.
    6. Entry Control

      1. Management of the main transportation routes shall be coordinated by the PEOC as follows:
        1. In the case of marine, air and rail, through the relevant coordinating agency in the PEOC (federal liaison, MTO, OPP).
        2. In the case of road traffic, by the Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC) via the MCSCS representative in the PEOC.
      2. In the event of an ongoing emission or one that is imminent, the PEOC Commander should consider the following entry control measures and notify the proper authorities for implementation as appropriate:
        1. Suspension of through traffic on Highway 21.
        2. Suspension of marine traffic in the Detailed Planning Zone area (Sectors 7 - 9) of Lake Huron.
        3. Aircraft should be kept clear of the Detailed Planning Zone.
    7. Transportation Management

      1. A Unified Transportation Management Plan (UTMP) shall be developed for the Detailed Planning Zone as well as the arterial roads that provide access to this zone. During an emergency, the Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC) (see Paragraph 3.1.3) shall be responsible for implementing the UTMP.
      2. The Unified Transportation Coordination Centre (UTCC) shall operate in coordination with the Municipal Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs), and the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC).
      3. The UTMP shall be designed to allow implementation in incremental stages consistent with the agreed upon evacuation time estimate data and the provincial emergency response levels. For example, a staged approach may include:
        1. Stage 1: The aim in this stage could be to keep traffic flowing smoothly on the main evacuation routes and ensure that these routes remain open.
        2. Stage 2: UTMPs could prevent traffic from entering the Detailed Planning Zone and divert traffic around it. However, access should be allowed for emergency workers who have tasks to perform in the Detailed Planning Zone. Stage 1 measures should continue.
        3. Stage 3: Could be initiated when it appears that particular sectors are likely to be evacuated. Additional resources should be deployed to ensure that evacuation proceeds smoothly beyond the Detailed Planning Zone boundary. Stages 1 and 2 measures should continue.
      4. The timing and order of sector evacuations shall be determined by the PEOC Commander, in coordination with the UTCC.
      5. The UTMP shall provide, where applicable, for the priority evacuation of any response sectors if and when ordered.
      6. Operational directives implementing evacuations (or emergency orders issued in the event of a declared emergency) shall be accompanied by emergency bulletins issued by the PEOC Commander.
    8. Emergency Worker Safety

      1. At the commencement of an emergency resulting in the activation of this plan, the response sectors in the Detailed Planning Zone shall be assumed to carry the following default safety status (PNERP Master Plan, Annex H), based on the category of the notification initiated by BNGS:
        1. On-Site Emergency Notification with an ongoing emission:
          1. Sectors 1 and 7              -           ORANGE
          2. All other sectors              -           GREEN
        2. General Emergency Notification with an ongoing emission:
          1. Sectors 1 and 7              -           RED
          2. Sectors 2, 3 and 8          -           ORANGE
          3. All other sectors              -           GREEN
        3. All other cases:

          If there is no ongoing emission, then the sector safety status for all sectors should be GREEN and should remain GREEN until an emission commences.

      2. The PEOC Science Section Chief shall make recommendations on sector safety status to the PEOC Commander for approval and update recommendations as data becomes available.
      3. The PEOC Commander shall reassign safety status to all sectors and update them periodically as soon as relevant data is available.
      4. During the course of an emission over land, safety sector status updates shall be done on an hourly basis and promptly communicated by the PEOC Commander to all stakeholders.
      5. It is the responsibility of each organization with emergency workers operating or required to operate in the Detailed Planning Zone to ensure that they are kept apprised of the current safety status of response sectors.
      6. The municipal plans shall provide for the setting up of Emergency Worker Centres (EWCs), as appropriate (PNERP Master Plan, Paragraph 7.10.3).
      7. The BNGS operator is responsible for the monitoring and decontamination aspect of EWCs, the relevant details of which are provided in their plans and procedures.
      8. Emergency workers who need to enter a sector shall first report to an EWC, where they will be provided with personal monitoring devices and briefed on the health risks and precautions they should observe and any maximum time limit on their stay in the sector (see Paragraph 6.8.1 above).
      9. If an emission is ongoing, emergency services (police, fire and paramedic services) who are required to operate in the Automatic Action Zone (before an Emergency Worker Centre is functioning) should carry and use the following equipment:
        1. personal protective equipment (e.g., respiratory protection, gloves, etc.)
        2. dosimetry
        3. stable iodine tablets (one tablet to be ingested prior to entering a RED sector)
        4. a card listing the default safety status of sectors (see Paragraph 6.8.1 above) and the precautions to be taken for each safety status (PNERP Master Plan, Annex H)
      10. Municipal plans shall detail how these emergency services obtain these items, appropriately store them, and maintain such equipment so that it is readily available when needed. The BNGS operator shall provide assistance in obtaining and maintaining items Paragraph 6.8.9 a) and b) above.
    9. Population Monitoring and Medical Management

      1. The BNGS operator shall resource two Monitoring and Decontamination Units (MDUs) as follows:
        1. Two MDUs should be located at fixed sites (e.g., at the Reception Centres in Kincardine and Port Elgin).
        2. MDUs should be mobile facilities and transportable when required to locations which have been pre-designated.
        3. Resources shall be provided that support mobility and relocation if required.
      2. Designated Municipalities and the BNGS operator shall collaborate to identify in their respective emergency plans, multiple sites within the DPZ and CPZ which could host mobile MDUs, to ensure the availability of infrastructure and amenities to support their operation.
      3. Fixed and pre-designated sites for mobile units shall be selected so as to provide, as far as practical, monitoring and decontamination options for all directions surrounding the Detailed Planning Zone.
      4. Fixed and mobile MDUs shall provide both assurance monitoring, for those who have undertaken self-decontamination, as well as monitoring and decontamination for those evacuees who either require or desire it upon evacuating the Detailed Planning Zone.
      5. The MOHLTC is responsible for leading and coordinating the health response and maintaining health services during nuclear and radiological emergencies. As such, the MOHLTC shall develop arrangements, in coordination with the BNGS operator, hospitals, Designated Municipalities and their public health units, to track evacuees for the purposes of contamination assessments (internal and external) and to provide follow up with those affected.
      6. The Radiation Health Response Plan (RHRP) shall be fully activated through the MOHLTC EOC when it seems likely that the incident may result in high radiation exposures to some persons necessitating medical management.
    10. Provincial Liquid Emission Response Plan (PLERP)

      1. The main radiation (e.g., tritium) exposure pathway for a liquid emission from BNGS is through contamination of a water supply source, with the resulting hazard being the subsequent ingestion of contaminated water.
      2. If a liquid emission has occurred at BNGS in conjunction with an event that meets the notification category system as detailed in this implementing plan, then it shall be managed within this implementing plan.
      3. If a liquid emission has occurred at BNGS and has not occurred in conjunction with an event that meets the notification category system as detailed in this implementing plan, then it shall be managed in accordance with the BNGS operator’s liquid emission response plan.
      4. A liquid emission response undertaken pursuant to the PLERP, may shift to a PNERP response if events escalate to a magnitude where it is deemed appropriate by the PEOC Commander.
    11. Management of Radioactive Waste
      1. For large waste volumes and high radioactive levels, existing disposal facilities may be insufficient or unsuitable, thereby necessitating alternative means of disposal, including the potential for construction of new facilities.
      2. The following factors should be considered in the determination of waste disposal siting (existing or new):
        1. proximity to the incident area
        2. proximity to residential areas or commercial districts
        3. proximity to transportation corridors
        4. for newly designated sites, the existing level of contamination and potential for remediation
        5. consistency with national and international standards and practices for the management and control of radioactive waste; and
        6. solutions to protect the health and safety of persons and the environment
      3. When appropriate, the PEOC Commander shall appoint a working group to implement a waste management plan, comprised of representatives of:
        1. provincial ministries (e.g., MOECC, ENERGY, MOL and MTO)
        2. federal departments (e.g., CNSC, Environment, and NRC)
        3. municipal public works departments
        4. reactor facility specialists
        5. private sector organizations, as applicable
Table showing the boundaries of each BNGS Response Sector in the DPZ.
SECTOR SECTOR BOUNDARY (north; east; south; west)
1

Concession 8 (including Scott’s Point); Lake Range Road; Concession 6; Bluff; Concession 2; east and south boundaries of Inverhuron Provincial Park.

2

Concession 10; J Sideroad; Concession 4; east boundary of Sector 1.

3

Concession 4; J Sideroad; old boundaries of (former Tiverton Village); County Road 15; east boundary of Sector 1.

4

Concession 14 and County Road 11; 10 Sideroad;Concession 10; Shoreline.

5

Concession 10; 10 Sideroad; County Road 15; J Sideroad (excluding former Tiverton).

6

County Road 15 (excluding Tiverton); 10 Sideroad; Concession 7; Shoreline.

Table showing the population estimates for each BNGS response sector including the BNGS site.
SECTOR POPULATION[8]
1 600
2 197
3 1,779
4 515
5 467
6 950
BNGS Site 3,400
TOTALS
Municipality of Kincardine
(Bruce Township/Tiverton/Kincardine Township)
4,508
BNGS Site 3,400
TOTAL SECTORS 7,908

General

  1. The Contingency Planning Zone (CPZ) is a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility, beyond the Detailed Planning Zone, where contingency planning and arrangements are made in advance, so that during a nuclear emergency, protective measures can be extended beyond the Detailed Planning Zone as required to reduce potential for exposure.
  2. The CPZ included within the PNERP Master Plan and Implementing Plans is aligned with new standards and guidance documents, including the Canadian Standards Association’s (CSA) N1600 General Requirements for Nuclear Emergency Management Programs, International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) General Safety Requirements (GSR) Part 7.
  3. The CPZ is intended to be used as necessary in the event of very low probability, severe accident situations where the area affected could extend beyond the Detailed Planning Zone.
  4. The CPZ does not require the same level or type of detailed arrangements as the Automatic Action Zone or Detailed Planning Zone, in so far as there are no default or pre-planned protective measures associated with the CPZ.
  5. Response activities within the CPZ may occur in the event of a limited and localized radiological release and based on the results received from environmental radiation monitoring activities.
  6. The distribution of Iodine Thyroid Blocking pills should be undertaken in a manner consistent with the processes established for the Ingestion Planning Zone.
  7. Public Education requirements are consistent with the processes stipulated for the Ingestion Planning Zone.
  8. The designation of additional primary emergency facilities beyond those designated in the Detailed Planning Zone is not required (e.g., Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs), Emergency Information Centres (EIC), Reception Centres, Evacuation Centres, MDU facilities, etc.). However, municipalities are required to identify and document in their municipal plans, those sites that could be used as a back-up or alternative location in the event that the primary emergency facility becomes unavailable.

Operational Response Activities Within the CPZ

  1. Operational response activities within the CPZ should unfold using the planning, communication, assessment and command and control mechanisms set out in this document and the PNERP Master Plan. For example, public alerting and emergency communications would be conducted using existing processes and systems as established for the Ingestion Planning Zone and beyond.
  2. Operational response activities within the CPZ would be focused on monitoring dose rates from deposition (e.g., groundshine) in order to determine which specific locations or areas beyond the Detailed Planning Zone may require the imposition of exposure control measures (e.g., evacuation, sheltering-in-place, Iodine Thyroid Blocking (ITB), etc.).
  3. In the event of a radiological release, the PEOC would undertake the following functions:
    1. The PEOC would determine and advise stakeholders on the direction of the radioactive plume and likely radioactive material deposition locations.
    2. The PEOC would direct field sampling teams to measure for radioactive material deposition in suspected locations.
    3. The PEOC Scientific Section would employ its existing mechanisms, processes and procedures to assess environmental radiation monitoring results and analyze the data received from the field sampling teams to identify the size and boundaries for the response activities within the eight CPZ sub-zones (see Figure 2.2) and to make protective action recommendations to the PEOC Commander, consistent with the results received and the in line with this plan’s guiding principles (PNERP Master Plan, Section 1.2).  
    4. The PEOC Commander would promulgate protective actions using existing communication methods specified in this Implementing Plan.
  4. Municipalities would be required to identify any emergency facilities that may be at risk of exposure to a radioactive plume during the emergency.  Municipalities and the PEOC would then collaborate to determine which previously identified alternate facilities would be used to support the response. In the event of an emergency where all previously identified alternative facilities are unavailable, the PEOC will identify and source appropriate alternate facilities and communicate the location of these facilities to the Emergency Response Organization.  
  5. The emergency information function would be engaged to advise the public and stakeholders which areas of the CPZ have been impacted and what protective actions are required.

NUCLEAR / RADIOLOGICAL GLOSSARY

(Reference: Paragraph 2.3.2)

(For other references see Provincial Glossary)

Abnormal Incident
An abnormal occurrence that may have a significant cause and/or may lead to more serious consequences. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Accident
Any unintended event, including operating errors, equipment failures or other mishaps, the consequences or potential consequences of which are significant from the point of view of protection or safety. With respect to nuclear criticality safety, the term accidents or accident sequences means events or event sequences, including external events that lead to violation of the sub-criticality margin (that is, to exceeding the upper subcritical limit). (Source CNSC Glossary)
Activation
decisions and actions taken to implement a plan, a procedure or to open an emergency operations centre. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Alerting
Informing the population, by means of an appropriate signal, that a nuclear emergency has occurred or is about to occur.
As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
A principle of radiation protection that holds that exposures to radiation are kept as low as reasonably achievable, social and economic factors taken into account. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Automatic Action Zone (AAZ)
a pre-designated area immediately surrounding a reactor facility where pre- planned protective actions would be implemented by default on the basis of reactor facility conditions with the aim of preventing or reducing the occurrence of severe deterministic effects.
(Source Canadian Standards Association (CSA) N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Becquerel (Bq)
The International System of Units (SI) unit of radioactivity. One becquerel (Bq) is the activity of a quantity of radioactive material in which one nucleus decays per second. In Canada, the Bq is used instead of the non-SI unit curie (Ci). (Source CNSC Glossary)
Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA)
An accident less frequent and potentially more severe than a design-basis accident. Note For a reactor facility, a beyond-design-basis accident may or may not involve fuel degradation. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
A common type of light-water reactor, where water is allowed to boil in the core, generating steam directly in the reactor vessel to generate electrical power. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Buffer Zone
an area beyond the Restricted Zone, where limited areas of radioactivity are detected. The buffer zone is initially delineated based on results of preliminary environmental radiation monitoring. Ingestion Control measures may be applied within this zone, based on guidance provided by the Operational Intervention levels (OILs) and, in accordance with direction provided by the Environmental Radiation and Assurance Monitoring Group (ERAMG).
CANDU Reactor
A Canadian-invented pressurized heavy-water reactor that uses heavy water (deuterium oxide) for moderator and coolant and natural uranium for fuel. “CANDU” is short for CANada Deuterium Uranium. Also called CANDU. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Cloudshine
Gamma radiation from radioactive materials in an airborne plume.
Communications
Advisories, directives, information and messages that are transmitted.
(Source Provincial Glossary)
Community
A generic term that includes both municipalities and First Nations.
(Source Provincial Glossary)
Containment (System)
A series of physical barriers that exist between radioactive materials contained in a reactor facility and the environment. Containment usually refers only to the reactor and vacuum buildings, and integral systems such as dousing.
Contamination
contamination refers to nuclear or hazardous substances on surfaces, or within solids, liquids or gases (including the human body), where their presence is unintended or undesirable, or to the process giving rise to their presence in such places. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Contingency Planning Zone (CPZ)
a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility, beyond the Detailed Planning Zone, where contingency planning and arrangements are made in advance, so that during a nuclear emergency, protective actions can be extended beyond the Detailed Planning Zone as required to reduce potential for exposure. (Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Note The actual CPZ for each reactor facility is specified in the relevant implementing plans of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan.
Crop Control
SeeProduce and Crop Control
Declaration of Emergency
A signed declaration made in writing by the Head of Council or the Premier of Ontario in accordance with the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act.nbsp; This declaration is usually based on a situation or an impending situation that threatens public safety, public health, the environment, critical infrastructure, property, and/or economic stability and exceeds the scope of routine community emergency response.

Notes

  1. Municipal Declaration of Emergency a declaration of emergency made by the Head of Council or a Municipality, based on established criteria.
  2. Provincial Declaration of Emergency a declaration of emergency made by the Lieutenant Governor of Council or the Premier of Ontario, based on established criteria.

(Source Provincial Glossary)

Decontamination
Reduction or removal of radioactive contamination in or on materials, persons or the environment.
Design Basis Accident (DBA)
accident conditions against which a facility is designed according to established design criteria, and for which the damage to the fuel and the release of radioactive material are kept within authorized limits.
(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Designated Host Municipality
The Municipality assigned responsibility in the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan for the reception and care of people evacuated from their homes in a nuclear emergency.
Designated Municipality
A Municipality in the vicinity of a reactor facility which has been designated under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, as one that shall have a nuclear emergency plan (for list see Annex A).
Detailed Planning Zone
a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility, incorporating the Automatic Action Zone, where pre-planned protective actions are implemented as needed on the basis of reactor facility conditions, dose modelling, and environmental monitoring, with the aim of preventing or reducing the occurrence of stochastic effects.
(Source Modified from CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Deterministic Effects
Radiation-induced health effects including changes to cells and tissues that are certain to occur in an individual exposed to a radiation dose greater than some threshold dose, with a severity that increases with increasing dose. Now referred to as tissue reactions. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Disaster
A serious disruption to an affected area, involving widespread human, property, environmental and / or economic impacts, that exceed the ability of one or more affected communities to cope using their own resources. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Dose
A measure of the radiation received or “absorbed” by a target. The quantities termed absorbed dose, organ dose, equivalent dose, effective dose, committed equivalent dose or committed effective dose are used, depending on the context. The modifying terms are often omitted when they are not necessary for defining the quantity of interest.
Dose Management
Includes administrative controls to limit doses, monitor doses and record doses received by emergency workers while fulfilling their duties related to nuclear emergency response.
Dose Projection
The calculation of projected dose (see Projected Dose).
Dose Rate
The amount of radiation dose which an individual would receive in a unit of time. In the context of this Plan, the measurement units are multiples or submultiples of the Sievert (or rem) per hour.
Dosimeter
An instrument for measuring and registering total accumulated exposure to ionizing radiation.
Drill
supervised instruction intended to test, develop, maintain, and practice the skills required in a particular emergency response or recovery activity.
Note A drill can be a component of an exercise.
(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Effective Dose (E)
A quantity calculated by multiplying the equivalent dose received by irradiated tissues, by a tissue specific weighting factor that reflects the risk of radiation-induced cancer to that tissue. The effective doses can then be summed to obtain the effective dose absorbed by the body.
Emergency
A situation or an impending situation that constitutes a danger of major proportions that could result in serious harm to persons or substantial damage to property and that is caused by the forces of nature, a disease or other health risk, an accident or an act whether intentional or otherwise (EMCPA). (Source Provincial Glossary)
Emergency Action Level
Pre-determined criteria related to on-site conditions (e.g. plant parameters) which trigger the implementation of protective actions, particularly in the Automatic Action Zone. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Emergency Bulletin
Directions to the public on appropriate protective and other measures to be taken during a nuclear or radiological emergency, which are issued by the province and broadcast through the media.
Emergency Information (EI)
Information about an emergency that can be disseminated in anticipation of an emergency or during an emergency. It may provide situational information or directive actions to be taken by the public. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Emergency Information Centre (EIC)
A designated facility that is properly equipped to monitor and co-ordinate emergency information activities including the dissemination of information to the public. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Emergency Response Organization
A group (public, private or volunteer), trained in emergency response that may be called upon to respond to an emergency situation. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Emergency Worker
a person performing emergency services to support emergency response.

Notes

  1. Emergency workers can include the following nuclear emergency workers required to remain in, or to enter, areas affected or likely to be affected by radiation from a nuclear emergency, and for whom special safety arrangements are required; emergency workers required to provide response outside the affected areas.
  2. This does not include nuclear energy workers.
  3. Emergency workers can include police, firefighters, paramedic services and emergency social services workers, and other essential services.

(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)

Emergency Worker Centre
A facility set up to monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.
Entry Control
The prevention of non-essential persons from entering a potentially dangerous area.
Environmental Decontamination
See Decontamination.
Equivalent Dose
The absorbed dose multiplied by a weighting factor for the type of radiation giving the dose. Weighting factors for use in Canada are prescribed by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. This term is also sometimes called weighted dose.nbsp; Expressed in terms of Sievert (or rem).
Evacuation
A directed protective action for the controlled displacement of the population from an area which has been or might become contaminated by radioactive substances to avoid exposure.
(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Evacuation Centre
A centre which provides affected people with basic human needs including accommodation, food and water.
(Source Australian Emergency Management Glossary)
Exclusion Zone
A parcel of land within or surrounding a reactor facility on which there is no permanent dwelling and over which a licensee has the legal authority to exercise control. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Exercise
A simulated emergency in which players carry out actions, functions, and responsibilities that would be expected of them in a real emergency. Exercises can be used to validate plans and procedures, and to practice prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities.
Exposure
The act or condition of being subject to irradiation. Exposure can be either external exposure (irradiation by sources outside the body) or internal exposure (irradiation by sources inside the body).
Exposure Control
Emergency operations aimed at reducing or avoiding exposure to a plume or puff of radioactive material. Measures to deal with surface contamination and re-suspension might also be included.
Exposure Pathways
The routes by which radioactive material can reach or irradiate humans.
External Notification
The notification of organizations and agencies (not directly part of the emergency management organization) which may be affected by a nuclear emergency, or which may be required to assist in responding to it.
Far Incident
A transborder nuclear accident or event anywhere in the world which could affect Ontario, other than a Near Incident (see Near Incident).
Food Control
Measures taken to prevent the consumption of contaminated foodstuffs and control of including the supply of uncontaminated foodstuffs. Where appropriate, such control may include foodstuff storage to permit radionuclide decay, diversion of foodstuff to non-human, non-foodstuff chain use or disposal of unusable stocks.
Foodstuff
Food or drink intended for human consumption, including (a) an ingredient of food or drink intended for human consumption or (b) any animal or plant, or any of its parts, from which food or drink, or an ingredient of food or drink, intended for human consumption may be derived.
Fuel Failure
Any rupture of a fuel sheath such that fission products may be released. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Gamma Radiation
Penetrating electromagnetic radiation emitted from an atom’s nucleus. Also called gamma rays. (Source CNSC Glossary)
General Emergency
Events at a nuclear power plant or onboard a nuclear-powered vessel resulting in an actual or substantial risk of a release of radioactivity or radiation exposure which warrants the implementation of protective actions off site. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Generic Criteria
Expressed as a projected dose, over a specified time period, above which protective actions are recommended to reduce the risk of stochastic effects.
Government Operations Centre
The federal government organization located in the National Capital Region which directs the mobilization and delivery of national support to the affected province in the case of an event in or near Canada, or which co-ordinates federal actions in the case of an international event.
Gray (Gy)
The International System of Units (SI) unit of measurement used to express absorbed dose. One gray is defined as the absorption of 1 joule of ionizing radiation by 1 kilogram of matter. For gamma and beta radiations, the gray is numerically equal to the Sievert. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Groundshine
Gamma and/or beta radiation from radioactive material deposited on the ground.
Guaranteed Shutdown State
A reactor is considered to be in this state when there is sufficient negative reactivity to ensure sub-criticality in the event of any process failure, and approved administrative safeguards are in place to prevent net removal of negative reactivity.
Helper
Member of the public who willingly and voluntarily helps in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. (Source IAEA General Safety Requirements (GSR) Part 7)
Hostile Action
Any deliberate action, or threat of action, which could cause a nuclear emergency.
Imminent Release
A radioactive emission that will occur in 12 hours or less.
Ingestion Control
Emergency response operations in which the main aim is to avoid or reduce the risk from ingestion of contaminated foodstuff and water.
Ingestion Planning Zone
a pre-designated area surrounding a reactor facility where plans or arrangements are made to
  1. protect the food chain;
  2. protect drinking water supplies;
  3. restrict consumption and distribution of potentially contaminated produce, wild-grown products, milk from grazing animals, rainwater, animal feed; and

    Note: Wild-grown products can include mushrooms and game.

  4. restrict distribution of non-food commodities until further assessments

(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)

Initial Notification
The notification made by a reactor facility to Provincial and/or municipal authorities upon the occurrence of an event or condition which has implications for public safety, or could be of concern to these authorities. The criteria and channels for making such notification are usually described in emergency plans.
Internal Notification
The notification by an organization to its personnel who are required to respond to an emergency.
Intervention Level
A radiation dose above which a specific protective action is generally justified. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Iodine Thyroid Blocking
The reduction or prevention of the absorption of radioiodine by the thyroid gland, which is accomplished by the intake of a stable iodine compound (such as potassium iodide) by people exposed or likely to be exposed to radioiodine.
Ionizing Radiation
For the purposes of radiation protection, radiation capable of producing ion pairs in biological material(s). Ionizing radiation is constantly present in the environment and includes the radiation that comes from both natural and artificial sources, such as cosmic rays, terrestrial sources (radioactive elements in the soil), ambient air (radon), and internal sources (food and drink). (Source CNSC Glossary)
Joint Information Centre
Anbsp;joint centre for the province, Designated Municipality, federal government and the reactor facility or nuclear establishment that is responsible for providing information on the emergency to the media and the public.
Land Control
Control on the use of contaminated land for growing food products or animal feed.
Livestock Control
Quarantine of livestock in the affected area to prevent movement to other areas. Slaughter of such animals for food may be banned.
Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)
A type of reactor accident that results from a loss of coolant due to a break in the primary heat transport system. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Lower-tier Municipality
A Lower-tier Municipality is the most basic unit of local government and includes townships, towns, and cities within a county or region, but excludes single tier municipalities. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Malevolent Act
An illegal action or an action that is committed with the intent of causing wrongful harm. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Megabecquerel
106 becquerels. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Microsievert (μSv)
One-millionth of a sievert. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Milk Control
Preventing the consumption of locally produced milk in the area affected by a nuclear emergency, and its export outside the area until it has been monitored.nbsp; Collection of contaminated milk, its diversion to other uses, or its destruction, may also be involved.
Millisievert (mSv)
One-thousandth of a sievert. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Ministry Action Group (MAG)
The Ministry Action Group (MAG) is composed of the deputy minister or designate of the ministry, the senior ministry official appointed to the ministry’s emergency management program committee, the ministry’s emergency management program coordinator; and such other ministry employees as may be appointed by the minister. nbsp; The group shall direct the ministry’s response in an emergency, including the implementation of the ministry’s emergency plan. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Mitigate
Actions taken to reduce the adverse impacts of an emergency or disaster. Such actions may include diversion or containment measures to lessen the impacts of a flood or a spill. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Municipality
Municipality” means a geographic area whose inhabitants are incorporated (Municipal Act). (Source Provincial Glossary)
Near Incident
A transborder nuclear accident or event at a site within 80 km of Ontario.
Notification
Conveying to a person or an organization, by means of a message, warning of the occurrence or imminence of a nuclear emergency, usually includes some indication of the measures being taken or to be taken to respond to it.
Nuclear Emergency
an emergency that has led to or could lead to the release of radioactive material, or exposures to uncontrolled sources of radiation, which pose, or could pose, a threat to health and safety, property, and the environment.
(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Nuclear Establishment
A facility that uses, produces, processes, stores or disposes of a nuclear substance, but does not include a reactor facility. It includes, where applicable, any land, building, structures or equipment located at or forming part of the facility, and, depending on the context, the management and staff of the facility.
Nuclear Facility
A generic term covering both nuclear establishments and reactor facilities.
Nuclear Substance
As defined in the (Federal) Nuclear Safety and Control Act.
Off-site
Off-site refers to the area outside the boundary (fence) of a reactor facility.
On-site
On-site refers to the area inside the boundary (fence) of a reactor facility.
Operational Directive
Direction given by the Emergency Response Organization to implement operational measures.
Operational Intervention Level (OIL)
a calculated value, measured by instruments or determined by laboratory analysis that corresponds to an intervention level.

Notes

  1. OILs are typically expressed in terms of dose rates or of activity of radioactive material released, time integrated air concentrations, ground or surface concentrations, or activity concentrations of radionuclides in environmental, food, or water samples.
  2. An OIL is a type of action level that can be used immediately by default and directly (without further assessment) to determine the appropriate protective actions and other response actions on the basis of an environmental measurement.

(Source Based on CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)

Operational Measures
Measures undertaken by the Emergency Response Organization to deal with the emergency, including measures to enable or facilitate protective action for the public, e.g., public alerting, public direction, activation of plans, traffic control, emergency information, etc.
Operator
holder of a subsisting licence issued pursuant to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act for the operation of a reactor facility.
Optimization
The process of determining a level of protection and safety that makes exposures and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures as low as reasonably achievable, with economic and social factors being taken into account.
Pasture Control
Removing milk- and meat-producing animals from pasture and from access to open water sources, and supplying them with uncontaminated feed and water.
Personal Monitoring
The use of radiation monitoring devices to assess whether persons, and their belongings, including vehicles, are contaminated or not, and, if contaminated, the type and level of contamination.
Personal Protective Equipment
Clothing or other specialised equipment provided to an off-site emergency worker to prevent or reduce their exposure to radioactive material. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Planning Zone
the area in which implementation of operational and protective actions are or might be required during a nuclear emergency, in order to protect public health, safety, and the environment.
Note See definitions for Automatic Action Zone, Detailed Planning Zone, Contingency Planning Zone, and Ingestion Planning Zone. (Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Plume
A cloud of airborne radioactive material that is transported in the direction of the prevailing wind from a reactor facility. A plume results from a continuing release of radioactive gases or particles. (This term may also be used for waterborne radioactive material resulting from a liquid emission. Where the context does not make it clear, this will be referred to as a waterborne plume).
Population Monitoring and Medical Management
The protective action strategy which includes population screening, decontamination, internal contamination assessment and medical follow-up. The purpose of this Protective Action Strategy is to reduce exposures to individuals. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Precautionary Measures
Measures which will facilitate the application and effectiveness of protective measures.
Preparedness
Actions taken prior to an emergency or disaster to ensure an effective response. These actions include the formulation of emergency response plans, business continuity/continuity of operations plans, training, exercises, and public awareness and education. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Prevention
Actions taken to stop an emergency or disaster from occurring. Such actions may include legislative controls, zoning restrictions, improved operating standards/procedures or critical infrastructure management. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Probability
The likelihood of an event occurring that may result in an emergency, disaster or service disruption. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Produce and Crop Control
Restrictions on the harvesting or processing of potentially or actually contaminated crops, vegetables and fruits. Measures include embargoing export outside the affected area; storage to allow radionuclide decay; diversion to non‑food chain use; destruction and disposal of contaminated produce.
Projected Dose
The highest committed effective equivalent dose, or committed equivalent dose to a specified organ or tissue, likely to be received through all applicable exposure pathways by the most exposed member of the critical group in the area for which the projection is being made.
Protective Measures
Measures designed to protect against exposure to radiation during a nuclear emergency. (See Table 6.1).
Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC
) A fully equipped facility maintained by the Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management (OFMEM) that can be activated in response to, or in anticipation of, emergencies. The PEOC is staffed with appropriate representatives from ministries that have been delegated responsibilities for specified emergencies as well as OFMEM staff, and other stakeholders/partners in emergency management. It serves as a coordinating point-of-contact for the affected Municipality, provincial, and federal interests. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP)
A Cabinet approved emergency response plan for reactor facility emergencies mandated under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act and maintained by the province of Ontario. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Public Alerting
See Alerting.
Public Awareness and Education Program
A program that provides focused information to a target audience to educate about protective actions to reduce the risk of life and property damage, in the event of an emergency. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Puff
A plume of short duration. The distinction between a puff and a plume is a matter of time. The upper limit on the duration of a puff is half an hour. (See alsoPlume).
Radiation
The emission by a nuclear substance, the production using a nuclear substance, or the production at a reactor facility of, an atomic or subatomic particle or electromagnetic wave with sufficient energy for ionization (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Radioactive Material
For purposes of nuclear security, any material that emits one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as alpha or beta particles, neutrons or gamma rays. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Radioiodine
A substance containing radioactive iodine in a chemical form that has a metabolic pathway similar to iodide, such as inorganic compounds and metabolic forms of organic iodine that are broken down in a living organism. Some examples are the radioisotopes iodine-125 and iodine-131. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Radioisotope
A variation in the form of atoms, of the same chemical element, which are distinguished by the number of neutrons in the nucleus. The number of protons remains the same, but the number of neutrons differs. For example, uranium has 16 different isotopes. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Radiological Emergency
Emergency caused by an actual or environmental hazard from ionizing radiation emitted by a source other than a reactor facility.
Radiological Device (RDs)
could be lost or stolen radioactive sources which may be in locations resulting in radiation exposure and/or contamination of the public, contamination of a site and/or contamination of foodstuff and water supplies.
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDDs)
A device that causes the dissemination of radioactive material.
Radionuclide
(or radioactive isotope or radioisotope) A naturally occurring or artificially created isotope of a chemical element having an unstable nucleus that decays, emitting alpha, beta and/or gamma rays until stability is reached.
Reactor Facility
a facility producing greater than 10 megawatts gross thermal energy from nuclear fuel and consisting of one or more reactor units.

Note This includes nuclear power plants and research reactors greater than 10 megawatts gross thermal energy.

Reception Centre
locations for the initial reception, monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuated members of the public, which provides or arranges for further emergency social services, humanitarian assessments and support.

Notes

  1. A public Reception Centre is typically located in an existing facility, such as a community centre. Public Reception Centres should be beyond the Detailed Planning Zone boundary.
  2. Examples of emergency social services include emergency shelter, food, clothing, victim registration and inquiry and personal services.
  3. Examples of humanitarian support include, but are not limited to housing and family reunification. (Source Modified IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-2.1.)
Recovery
the short-term and long-term actions taken in order to restore, to an acceptable level, both the organizations involved in, and the communities affected by, the nuclear emergency and the associated response activities. (Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Release
In the context of this plan, release refers to the emission of radioactive material to the environment from a reactor facility in the form of either an airborne or a liquid emission.
Representative Individual
An individual that due to his/her characteristics, habits and location of residence, is representative of the more highly exposed individuals in the population. May also be referred to as Representative Person. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Response
the actions taken during a nuclear emergency to reduce the magnitude of the hazard and manage its consequences, including the impact of the hazard on people, property, and the environment.
(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Response Sectors
The Detailed Planning Zone is subdivided into Response Sectors to facilitate the planning and implementation of protective measures.
Restoration
Operations to restore conditions to normal after a nuclear emergency.
Restricted Zone
The area, within which exposure control measures are likely to be needed, based on the results of field monitoring. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Risk
The product of the probability of the occurrence of a hazard and its consequences. (Source Provincial Glossary)
Severe Accident
A beyond design basis accident involving fuel degradation in the reactor core or wet storage bay.
Shall
is used to express a requirement, i.e., a provision that the user is obliged to satisfy in order to conform to the PNERP.
Shelter-in-place
a directed protective action to take immediate refuge in an enclosed structure for protection from an airborne plume, deposited radionuclides, or both.

Notes

  1. Shelter-in-place is a protective action which uses the shielding properties of buildings and their potential for ventilation control to reduce the radiation dose to people inside. Shelter-in-place has varying degrees of effectiveness depending on the type of building construction.
  2. Shelter-in-place should typically not extend beyond two days.
  3. Shelter-in-place is utilized as a protective action if there is insufficient time to safely evacuate an area; if the dose projected for an area is so low that evacuation is not required; or the risks of evacuation are higher than shelter-in-place (e.g., severe weather inhibits safe evacuation).

(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)

Should
is used to express a recommendation or that which is advised but not required in order to conform to the PNERP.
Shutdown State
A subcritical reactor state with a defined margin to prevent a return to criticality without external actions. (Source CNSC Glossary)
SI
International System of Units. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Sievert
The International System of Units (SI) unit of equivalent dose and effective dose, equal to 1 joule/ kilogram. (Source CNSC Glossary)
Source Term
A generic term applied to the radioactive material released from a reactor facility. It includes the quantity and type of material released as well as the timing and rate of its release. It could apply to a release that was currently occurring, or one which had ended, or one which could take place in the future.
Special Group
A group for which special constraints arise in the application of a protective measure, such as intensive care patients in hospitals and institutions, bedridden patients in long-term care homes, people with disabilities and/or special needs and inmates.
Stakeholder
a person, group, community, or organization that has a role in the management of a nuclear emergency. (Source Based on CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)
Stochastic Effects
Radiation-induced health effects, such as cancer and heritable diseases, which are associated with a statistical risk and where no threshold has been established. The probability of occurrence is proportional to the dose (the higher the dose the higher the probability of occurrence) but the severity of the effect is independent of dose. (Source Health Canada Glossary)
Support Municipality
Pursuant to Section 7.0.2 (4) of the EMPCA, the LGIC may, by order, specify a Municipality to act in a support capacity to provide assistance to Designated Municipalities.
Transborder Emergency
A nuclear emergency involving a reactor facility or nuclear accident or event outside the borders of Ontario that might affect people and property in the province.
Upper-tier Municipality
An upper-tier Municipality is a county or region. Upper-tier Municipality” means a Municipality of which two or more lower-tier municipalities form part for municipal purposes (Municipal Act). (Source Provincial Glossary)
Venting
The release to the atmosphere of radioactive material from the containment of a reactor facility through systems designed for this purpose.
Vulnerable populations
members of the public who have additional needs before, during, and after a nuclear emergency in one or more functional areas.

Notes

  1. Functional areas can include, but are not limited to, the following
    1. maintaining independence;
    2. communication;
    3. transportation;
    4. supervision; or
    5. medical care
  2. Individuals in need of additional assistance could include those who
    1. have disabilities;
    2. are from diverse cultures;
    3. have limited to no proficiency in the local official language; or
    4. are transportation disadvantaged

(Source CSA N1600, General requirements for nuclear emergency management programs)

Water Control
Measures taken to avoid the contamination of drinking water supplies and sources, and to prevent or reduce the consumption of contaminated water.
Weighted Dose
. See Equivalent Dose. Expressed in terms of Sievert (or rem).

[1] “Shadow evacuation” is the term used to describe when people beyond the officially declared evacuation zone who are not directly affected by a nuclear emergency choose to voluntarily leave the area.

[2] Clause 2.2.4 of REGDOC 2.10.1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response.

[3] Nuclear Generating Unit Schematic – CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor is a generic diagram.

[4] Reactor facility regulatory requirements are defined under CNSC REGDOC 2.10.1, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response.

[5] The term “practically 100%” means that the public alert can be heard or received by everyone in the alerting area unless exceptional circumstances provide an impediment.

[6] The focus of the public alerting system capability is on issuing the public alert. For example, if an auto dialer is used it needs to demonstrate that it has the capability to make all of the calls required within the specified timeframe.

[7] The provincial Alert Ready program ensures that emergency bulletins are broadcast in a timely manner via radio, television and mobile devices.

[8] Population estimates based on the 2016 Canada Census.